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1Abstract:
In the 1990s, a series of lawsuits ﬁled by states against the tobacco industry sought reimbursement
for Medicaid expenses paid for health care provided to citizens who suﬀered health eﬀects from smoking,
relying upon theories of unjust enrichment and conspiracy. Four of the states ﬁrst reached independent
settlements with the tobacco companies, and then four of the largest tobacco companies entered into a master
settlement agreement with the remaining forty-six states, agreeing to pay billions of dollars and to disband
its political lobbying and research groups to avoid the lawsuits. The agreement was a stunning development,
as merely four years of litigation had produced capitulation from an industry that had long been protected
by Congress from the reach of administrative agencies seeking to regulate toxic or harmful substances. It
prompted similar lawsuits against other industries, including suits by cities and counties around the country
against gun manufacturers and distributors seeking reimbursement for public funds spent dealing with the
eﬀects of violent gun crime. However, so far the litigation has managed only superﬁcial wounds to the gun
industry and has not yielded any hint of a major settlement. This paper explores the reasons why the
tobacco industry would agree to pay billions of dollars to avoid the state Medicaid lawsuits, while no similar
deal seems likely in the gun cases. As the explanation relies a good deal on the diﬀerences in the politics of
these two issues, some time is spent providing an historical assessment of the traditional politics of guns and
tobacco. The paper identiﬁes four critical factors that explain the diﬀerent outcomes in the gun and tobacco
lawsuits. First, the tobacco lawsuits had suﬃcient grounding in the law to survive early motions to dismiss,
prompting more lawsuits and heightening the pressure on the industry rather quickly. Most of the gun
lawsuits were dismissed rather quickly, reinforcing the industry’s approach to ﬁght each lawsuit on its own
merits. Second, the tobacco lawsuits were helped by insider documents exposing deliberate manipulation
by tobacco companies in misleading the public about the addictive nature of nicotine and the dangers of
smoking, whereas in the gun lawsuits, the plaintiﬀs so far have been without any “smoking guns” that would
help their cause, either legally or politically. Third, the Food and Drug Administration’s attempt to regulate
tobacco in the mid-1990s demonstrated the tobacco industry’s vulnerability; no federal agency has been
able to claim similar jurisdiction over the gun industry, while the National Riﬂe Association has remained
extraordinarily powerful in protecting gun manufacturers. Finally, some state legislatures responded to the
tobacco lawsuits by changing the legal rules to improve the chances for the state plaintiﬀs; yet almost the
complete opposite has occurred in the gun context, where many states moved to ban outright such lawsuits.
These diﬀerences reﬂect the interplay of law and politics in two powerful industries.
2I. Introduction
For most of American history, guns and tobacco have enjoyed a degree of protected status in American
politics, political cover that has enabled producers in these markets to continue to reap economic beneﬁt
from consumers who have maintained fairly heavy demand for these products against mounting evidence of
their dangerous eﬀects. On the gun side, the Second Amendment prohibition against infringements upon
“the right to keep and bear arms” has united gun owners and individual rights philosophers to rally against
legislative attempts to place restrictions on ﬁrearms. These individuals have drawn upon, and reinforced,
a gun culture that has taken hold in the United States and that distinguishes the country from most other
liberal democracies, in which the public has a high tolerance for individual ownership of weapons.1 In
the tobacco context, the federal government has deliberately tried to insulate tobacco from regulators of
most consumer products, preferring incremental legislative steps limited primarily to requiring warnings on
tobacco products and advertisements. Statutory exemptions have long reﬂected the predominance of tobacco
in Southern economies and the political strength of an industry that essentially operated as an oligopoly.
Beginning in the 1990s, a new trend in litigation strategies challenged the gun and tobacco industries,
raising new threats to their political power. State attorneys general began ﬁling suits against the largest
companies in the tobacco industry, seeking recovery of Medicaid expenses paid out to individuals who suﬀered
from the health eﬀects of smoking. From 1994, when Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore ﬁled the
1See Richard Hofstadter, America as a Gun Culture, in The Gun Control Debate: You Decide 29 (Lee Nisbet, ed., 2d
ed. 2001). Hofstadter attributes the continued gun culture in an increasingly urbanized America to a political antimilitaristic
tradition, a belief in access to ﬁrearms as a safeguard against tyranny, and a relic of the historical symbols of power in the
South during the slavery period. Id. at 34-37.
3ﬁrst state lawsuit against the largest companies in the tobacco industry, through 1997, attorneys general
from forty states ﬁled such Medicaid lawsuits.2 Soon after the federal government and the governments of
Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Brazil, Venezuela, and Thailand sought to capitalize on the new
legal theories of unjust enrichment and also sued for relief in United States courts for medical expenses.3
Remarkably, some of the ﬁrst cases ﬁled against tobacco companies were in Southern states, the political
power base of big tobacco; Florida, Texas, West Virginia, and Maryland joined Mississippi in leading the
charge of Medicaid reimbursement suits. While some states won early victories in these cases, others had
their suits dismissed, and it was not long before both the tobacco industry and the states had incentives to
seek a settlement. For the tobacco industry, simultaneously defending over forty lawsuits around the country
was expensive, and the lawsuits and private actions that had preceded the state suits had begun to produce
damaging documents showing deceptive practices within the industry.
Not long after the lawsuits were initially ﬁled, the tobacco defendants settled with Mississippi, Florida,
Texas, and Minnesota in those states’ individual lawsuits.4 These agreements generated the momentum
for a 1998 settlement between the four largest tobacco companies—Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Brown &
Williamson, and Lorillard—and the other forty-six states. The Master Settlement Agreement (“the MSA”),
as it became known, ended the states’ lawsuits but required the tobacco companies to pay an estimated
$206 billion over twenty-ﬁve years on top of the $40 billion committed in the four earlier settlements.5
Remarkably, the tobacco industry agreed to several advertising and marketing restrictions in the MSA, and
2See Tobacco Lawsuit Summary Chart, available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/summary.html (last
accessed March 30, 2005).
3Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic, and Political Legacy of the Governments’
Tobacco Litigation, 33 Conn. L. Rev. 1143, 1148-1149 (2001).
4Martha Derthick, Up in Smoke: From Legislation to Litigation in Tobacco Politics 164-170 (2d ed. 2005).
5Id. at 174-75.
4to disband its lobbying organization, the Tobacco Institute.6 The compromise was viewed as a success by
anti-smoking advocates, and it emboldened public policy-makers to join forces with private class action
lawyers to challenge other industries that had long enjoyed political protection. A ﬁfth company, Liggett,
settled independently.
Thus, it was not a great surprise when in 1998 New Orleans ﬁled the ﬁrst lawsuit by a city or county against
the gun manufacturing industry, seeking restitution payments for the damage done by gun violence. Soon
after, cities such as Philadelphia, Chicago, Los Angeles, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Miami ﬁled their own
lawsuits against gun manufacturers on similar legal theories. Many of the city suits that followed sought
recovery for the medical costs spent on gun victims in public hospitals, the costs for emergency personnel
responding to gun violence, and for lost tax revenue from properties that had been devalued by gun-related
crime.7 As the number of gun lawsuits increased steadily from 1998 through 2000, one might have expected
the industry to seek a grand-scale settlement similar to the MSA to avoid the inevitable escalation of the
number of lawsuits, particularly if the claims would outlast preliminary motions to dismiss and move into
the tedious and expensive discovery process. Indeed, the head of Handgun Control Inc., the predominant
gun control advocacy group, declared that the goal of the lawsuits was to force manufacturers into agreeing
to federal safety regulations.8
6Id. at 176-77. The advertising restrictions included: a prohibition on billboard advertising in arenas, malls, and arcades;
a ban on cartoon characters in advertisements; a prohibition on the distribution and sale of non-tobacco merchandise that
included logos except at tobacco-sponsored events; and a ban on sponsorship of sports, concerts, and events with signiﬁcant
youth appeal.
7Michael I. Krauss, Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos Masquerading as Tort Law, 71 Miss. L.J. 631, 639
(2001).
8Interview, Interview With Michael Barnes, President, Handgun Control, Inc., 6 Geo. Pub. Pol’y Rev. 31, 32 (2000).
5However, the gun industry has yet to enter into any agreement that would rival the MSA in the tobacco
context. Although Smith & Wesson did enter into its own settlement agreement in 2000 with plaintiﬀs in
several cases to avoid some of the lawsuits,9 the rest of the industry has remained steadfast in its opposition
to the litigious attacks on its business practices. Already the gun industry has held out for nearly twice as
long after the initial public lawsuit was ﬁled as the tobacco industry had, and it has shown few signs that it
is inclined to seek a settlement rather than to ﬁght each individual lawsuit on its merits.
This paper explores the reasons why the tobacco industry, and not the gun industry, has agreed to pay
billions of dollars and to disband its political activity by agreeing to a master settlement. The explanation
highlights the interplay of law and politics, as the industries were in far diﬀerent positions politically when
they faced these public entity lawsuits. At least four critical factors account for the diﬀerent outcomes. First,
the legal theories in the early tobacco lawsuits were strong enough to survive preliminary motions to dismiss,
prompting more lawsuits and heightening the pressure on the industry rather quickly. By contrast, few of the
early gun lawsuits were in court long enough to generate the same momentum across the industry. Second,
the tobacco lawsuits were helped by the revelation of insider documents exposing deliberate manipulation by
the tobacco industry in misleading the public about the addictive nature of nicotine, and in seeking to make
their products more addictive as a way to sustain and grow business. There was a great deal of political and
public outrage that ensued from these revelations that helped to make the political climate more favorable
for the public lawsuits against tobacco. The plaintiﬀs in the gun lawsuits have not been able to draw upon
similar documents, and thus do not enjoy the same political advantages as their state counterparts in the
9See Ed Dawson, Note, Legigation, 79 Tex. L. Rev. 1727, 1749-50 (2001). Smith & Wesson agreed to put serial numbers
in all new guns so as to make it more diﬃcult for criminals to remove them, to sell small trigger locks with each new handgun,
and to use “smart-gun” technology that would prevent unauthorized users from ﬁring new handguns within three years, and in
exchange the governments that had ﬁled suit against the manufacturer dropped their claims.
6tobacco suits. Third, the tobacco industry was weakened by the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”)
attempt to regulate tobacco in the mid-1990s; though it ultimately failed, FDA’s brashness exposed the
weakness of the industry in Congress, which could have blocked FDA from pursuing the industry. No federal
agency has been able to claim similar jurisdiction over the gun industry, and the pro-gun lobby has remained
extraordinarily powerful. This political dimension had another consequence, the fourth reason why the
tobacco suits and not the gun lawsuits settled. Many state legislatures responded to the tobacco lawsuits
by changing the legal rules to improve the chances for the state plaintiﬀs; yet almost the complete opposite
has occurred in the gun context, where many states moved to ban outright such lawsuits, and Congress
considered a measure that would grant the entire industry civil liability from any public lawsuit.
Part II of this paper examines the traditional political context for gun control and tobacco, to help explain
why lawsuits became a tactic of choice in the 1990s for those seeking stronger regulations of the two industries
and to highlight important diﬀerences in the politics of these two issues that have ramiﬁcations in the legal
arena. Part III then discusses each of the four important diﬀerences between the gun and tobacco lawsuits
with respect to the tobacco industry to explain why the MSA arose out of the litigation. Part IV explains
how diﬀerences in those four factors have so far led to a diﬀerent result in the gun context. Finally, Part V
oﬀers some brief insights about the impact of the tobacco and gun lawsuits, and the consequences that stem
from using lawsuits to drive regulatory action.
II. The Politics of Social Regulatory Policy – Guns and Tobacco
Understanding the traditional politics of ﬁrearms and tobacco regulation, and where they have diverged
7in several crucial areas in recent years, helps to explain the diﬀerent results in the tobacco lawsuits and
the gun control lawsuits. Under Ted Lowi’s famous model characterizing public policy issues, one would
predict that tobacco and guns would generate very similar political and legal outcomes. Lowi distinguishes
between four types of policies—regulatory, distributive, redistributive, and constituent—to understand the
political dynamics that make some policies particularly controversial.10 Regulatory policies are identiﬁed
by two deﬁnitive elements: ﬁrst, they seek to control individual conduct (of people or companies) rather
than aﬀect an “environment of conduct”; second, they are marked by an immediate and direct likelihood of
government coercion.11 In other words, regulatory policies seek to shape conduct rather than to distribute
beneﬁts or subsidies.12 Since gun control and tobacco policy are primarily social issues rather than economic
ones, they can be analyzed under a social regulatory policy rubric.13 As the government applies its coercive
powers to shape conduct, the prospect for controversy is highest where the government coercion is most
likely to directly aﬀect individual behavior.14 Moreover, social regulatory policies aﬀect individual behavior
in a realm where morals and values often conﬂict, and compared to economic policies, evoke strong reactions
among those who are being regulated.15 In guns and tobacco, the values of those who prefer individual
autonomy and claim a right to own a gun or smoke cigarettes clash with those who are concerned with the
negative externalities those actions have upon others. Social regulatory policies then provoke tremendous
10See Theodore J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 Pol’y Admin. Rev 298, 299 (1972). Lowi
describes his four types of policies in vague terms, relying upon speciﬁc examples to distinguish the four major types rather
than deﬁne them explicitly. Policies that aﬀect the environment of conduct include those that address the progressive income
tax, interest rates, Social Security, and congressional reapportionment. Distributive policies where individual conduct is targeted
include subsidies, tariﬀs, and land policies; regulatory policies where individual conduct is targeted include those dealing with
bankruptcy claims, market competition, abortion, and for our purposes gun control and tobacco consumption. The essential
point is not the categories but Lowi’s claim that diﬀerent policies lead to diﬀerent types of politics and diﬀerent political
outcomes.
11See id. at 299-300.
12Robert J. Spitzer, The Politics of Gun Control (2d ed. 2004).
13This is not to say that gun control and tobacco policy do not have signiﬁcant economic components. For example, tobacco
production is a mainstay in the economies of North Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and in the 1990s the industry was
taking in over $40 billion a year. However, in terms of state and Congressional legislative approaches to regulation, the focus
has been on restricting behavior in certain places (e.g. outlawing smoking on airplanes), preventing sales of tobacco products
to minors, and restricting advertising practices. See infra notes 87, 88, 89, and 90 and accompanying text. These are more
appropriately labeled as regulatory policies aimed at individual conduct than economic policies.
14Spitzer, supra note 12, at 4.
15See id. at 4-5.
8resistance and controversy, despite the growth of the welfare state and the public’s general expectation that
government do more to protect individuals by imposing on some individual conduct.16 Thus, this framework
oﬀers an understanding of the basic political dimensions of government regulation in the tobacco and gun
contexts that will in turn provide a foundation for analyzing the impact of politics on the outcomes in recent
ﬁrearms and tobacco litigation.
A. Hallmarks of Traditional Gun Control Politics
There are eight critical patterns of social regulatory policy that apply speciﬁcally to gun control and the
high degree of controversy generated by a policy that seeks to impose immediate regulation on individual
conduct.17
1.
The courts deﬁne the issue by determining the boundaries where the government can and cannot regulate in accordance with the Second Amendment.
2.
Single-issue groups play an important role in setting the agenda for the issue. Generally they are reluctant to compromise and prefer to defend absolutist positions, commonly seen in the history of the National Riﬂe Association’s involvement in legislative aﬀairs.
3.
Presidents exert largely symbolic leadership and are usually unable to cement the issue onto the national agenda.
4.
Political parties exploit fundamental diﬀerences on the issue, with conservative Republicans mobilizing against anti-gun legislation and liberal Democrats seeking tighter gun control laws.
16See Derthick, supra note 4, at 102-106 (discussing the growth of government and its impact on individual expectations
with respect to regulation of tobacco).
17Spitzer, supra note 12, at 15.
95.
Related to number three, Congress is usually more active in the issue than the president, but is less active than the states in addressing gun control.
6.
Even though public opinion generally favors gun restrictions, it is diﬃcult to mobilize that majority; single-issue groups prevail at the expense of the public. Support for change must be drawn from social and community norms and values, which are highlighted and challenged by public events that question those values.
7.
Federal administrative agencies lack both the resources and the jurisdiction to be a major player in the gun control debate.
8.
Even in the presence of some federal regulation, the states continue to enjoy a great deal of autonomy to address gun control. This relationship is opposite that which exists for most policies in the current political climate.18
It is useful to elaborate further on some of these critical aspects which ultimately help to explain the
diﬀerences in the outcomes of the tobacco and gun control litigation of the past ten years.
1. Focusing Events, Political Parties, and Marginal Policies
First, the public at large generally favors imposing some restrictions on individual behavior,19 but that sup-
port is widely-scattered and relatively weak compared to the well organized, vociferous opposition mounted
by a particular single-issue interest group, in this case the National Riﬂe Association. Focusing events are
crucial in providing momentum needed to galvanize and mobilize the diﬀuse public support to overcome the
smaller but more active and powerful resistance to stricter controls.20 These focusing events are disasters,
crises, personal experiences, or powerful symbols that draw attention to certain conditions.21
19See Gregg Lee Carter, The Gun Control Movement 49 (1997).
20John W. Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies (1984).
21See id. at 99-100.
10In general, such a symbol acts (much as personal experience) as reinforcement for something
already taking place and as something that rather powerfully focuses attention, rather than
as a prime mover in agenda setting. Symbols catch on and have important focusing eﬀects
because they capture in a nutshell some sort of reality that people already sense in a vaguer,
more diﬀuse way.22
Such events are usually necessary, but not suﬃcient, elements to generating stronger individual regulation.
The political parties must also be willing and able to reach some degree of compromise on the issue, since
they traditionally exploit their diﬀerences and might want to hold out against compromise legislation for the
prospects of future legislation.
While focusing events—traditionally large increases in violent crime, high-proﬁle gun tragedies, or assassinations—
have generated public pressure for gun control, rarely have these events resulted in signiﬁcant policy changes.
“Whilst over twenty thousand ﬁrearms laws and ordinances currently exist, mostly at a state and local rather
than federal level, their content is [weak compared to other liberal democracies]. This weakness is explained
by reference to a combination of lobbying inﬂuence of gun rights groups..., the nature of America’s political
culture, and the Second Amendment....”23 Since focusing events diminish in their eﬀectiveness over time,
the policy window for gun control is open only for brief moments;24 and given the power of competing
political forces and opposition interest groups, politicians favoring gun regulation have an incentive to craft
policies designed to maximize their appeal rather than their eﬀectiveness.25 This leads to marginal policy
development, if enough support is mustered for any development at all.
The Congressional response to the shootings at Columbine high school provides an enlightening example of
the interplay of political forces of focusing events, interest group activity, and political party decision-making.
23Robert Singh, Gun Politics in America: Continuity and Change, 52.1 Parliamentary Aff. 1, 3-4 (Jan. 1999).
24Kingdon, supra note 20, at 176.
25William J. Vizzard, The Impact of Agenda Conﬂict on Policy Formation and Implementation: The Case of Gun Control,
55.4 Pol’y Admin. Rev. 341, 344 (1995).
11Largely in response to the horriﬁc events of April 20, 1999 at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado,
where two students used a TEC-DC9 handgun, a sawed-oﬀ double-barreled shotgun, a pump-action shotgun,
and a 9mm semiautomatic riﬂe in a brutal assault on their school that killed thirteen and wounded twenty-
three, the House of Representatives considered the Mandatory Gun Show Background Check Act (“the Gun
Show Bill”).26 The bill would have closed a loophole in the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act (“the
Brady Bill”)27 that permits unlicensed dealers—those who are oﬀ-hand collectors and do not operate a gun
business—to avoid conducting a background check on potential buyers when selling weapons at gun shows.
Speciﬁcally, the Gun Show Bill called for a 24-hour waiting period on guns purchased from both licensed
and unlicensed dealers at gun shows, included a ban on the importation of large-capacity ammunition clips
(including those used in the Columbine massacre), and mandated safety locks be sold with new guns.28
House debate on this legislation followed on the heels of a May 1999 Senate vote on a juvenile crime bill
that included these controversial gun control provisions.29 Vice President Al Gore fulﬁlled his constitutional
duty and cast the deciding vote in a deadlocked Senate (50-50) to pass Senator Frank Lautenberg’s (D-NJ)
amendment that required safety locks on all new handguns and instituted a 72-hour waiting period for all
purchases at gun shows.30 The ﬁnal Senate version of the bill passed 73-25, enjoying bipartisan support.31
The victory gun control advocates had sought, and that the Columbine focusing event alone would have
predicted, was abruptly cut short when a strange coalition of liberal Democrats and some moderate Repub-
licans who normally favor gun control joined some conservative Republicans to kill the Gun Show Bill in the
26H.R. 2122, 106th Cong. (1999).
27Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
28H.R. 2122, 106th Cong. (1999).
29S. 254, 106th Cong. (1999).
30S. 254, S. Amdt. 362, 106th Cong. (1999).
31Republicans agreed to the bill 31-23, and Democrats voted 42-2 in favor of passage. Only six of 55 Republican Senators
supported Lautenberg’s amendment, but 26 Republicans who voted against the 72-hour background check reversed course and
supported the bill despite this provision.
12House. The most contentious issue was the waiting period; under current law, licensed dealers at gun shows
must submit buyers to a 72-hour background check period but unlicensed dealers have no such restrictions.32
A split coalition of the House approved an amendment oﬀered by Rep. John Dingell (D-MI) to impose an
equal 24-hour waiting period on purchases made from both licensed and unlicensed dealers.33 The House
then rejected an amendment proposed by Rep. Carolyn McCarthy (D-NY) to extend the 72-hour check
period to unlicensed dealers.34 Following these votes on the gun show background check period, gun control
advocates joined with staunch gun control opponents to defeat the entire package, even though the bill
contained provisions requiring gun safety locks, banning foreign ammunition clips, and imposing a 24-hour
waiting period on purchases made from unlicensed dealers at gun shows.35 In this instance, gun control
advocates considered no change in policy a better alternative to minimal additional regulation; they likely
preferred to preserve the issue for the 2000 election cycle, seeking to paint Republicans as extremist oppo-
nents of reasonable measures designed to respond to increased danger of gun violence in American schools.
If they secured the White House and additional Congressional seats in 2000, gun control advocates could
raise the issue of gun control again and seek to pass a law requiring background checks on gun purchases
from unlicensed dealers without shortening the period of such check for purchases from licensed dealers.
Whatever the reason for the defeat of the Gun Show Bill, the House leadership was able to secure passage of
its desired package of funding for juvenile crime programs and tougher sentences for juveniles in gun-related
crimes without including any gun control language, and the gun control provisions in the Senate version
were stricken in conference committee. Thus, Congress failed to translate indications from both political
32Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, § 102, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2004).
33H.R. 2122, H. AMDT. 215, 106th Cong. (1999). The Dingell amendment passed 218-211, with Republicans supporting
173-47 and Democrats opposing 45-163.
34H.R. 2122, H. AMDT. 216, 106th Cong. (1999). The McCarthy amendment failed 193-253, with Republicans strongly
rejecting the measure 33-186 and Democrats favoring by a 159-49 margin.
35The Mandatory Gun Show Background Check Act was defeated 147-280, with Democrats opposing by a 10-197 margin
and Republicans supporting by a 137-82 count.
13parties that some speciﬁc measures of gun control were acceptable and perhaps even necessary, and broad
public support for some reasonable gun control measures emanating from the spate of school shootings that
dominated the late 1990s, into a regulatory outcome. The defeat undoubtedly left those favoring stronger
gun control regulations deﬂated, and Congress has not made any serious eﬀort to increase gun restrictions
since.
2. The National Riﬂe Association – Imposing Fear and Avoiding Compromise
Another feature of traditional gun control politics is that the National Riﬂe Association (“the NRA”) plays
a prominent role in the political battles, galvanizing opposition to laws and regulations aimed at ﬁrearms,
and seeking to loosen restrictions when possible. In general, interest groups inﬂuence government behavior
by bringing to bear the weight of people and money on relevant political actors.
Because public bureaucracies need congressional and presidential support, the strength of
interest groups opposing and supporting the agency has a profound impact on its power
to inﬂuence public policy. Interest groups use their power to convince elected oﬃcials to
intervene in the bureaucracy’s activity and directly pressure it to act in ways favorable to
their interests.36
In the case of the NRA, three tactics have been particularly useful in imposing upon bureaucratic and
legislative institutions. First, the interest group has beneﬁted from demonizing a politically weak Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”),37 now part of the Department of Justice.38 Second,
it has been adept at rapidly organizing voters to barrage Congress with letters, phone calls, emails, and
37One example of the NRA’s desire to maintain the ATF as a focus of its ire is the campaign to eliminate the ATF in 1981.
President Reagan had targeted the ATF for budget cuts, proposing to redistribute its enforcement functions to the Secret
Service and the Customs Service. The NRA reversed its initial policy supporting the Reagan proposal and in 1982 lobbied
for the continuation of the ATF. “The NRA’s change of heart stemmed not from a newly found respect for the ATF but
from fear of what a highly respected Secret Service might do if it gained jurisdiction over federal ﬁrearms regulation and law
enforcement...” Id. at 28. For the NRA, the enemy it knows is preferable to the enemy it does not.
38See ATF web site, http://www.atf.gov (last accessed April 16, 2005).
14other communications opposing any tightening of gun control regulations, focusing its pressure at important
moments, in important places, on important individuals.39 Finally, the NRA has successfully used the Second
Amendment as a rallying cry, embracing a gun culture to help avoid regulations that might impinge on gun
sales.40 Most of this activity has been conducted through the Institute for Legislative Action (“ILA”), a
lobbying arm of the NRA that consumes 25% of the total NRA budget and devotes itself to staying involved
in politics year-round and mobilizing members whenever necessary.41
Two consequences of these tactics are: (1) that many politicians fear, or are at least wary of, the strength
of the NRA and its aggressive involvement in political campaigns, and (2) that the interest group itself is
often unwilling to compromise. To help it in electoral politics, the NRA has created the Political Victory
Fund, which successfully raised more than $20 million for campaign contributions in the 1999-2000 cycle.42
The NRA eﬀectively uses mass mailings that provoke fear or anger, or both, to mobilize its members to
inﬂuence powerful politicians. One such letter from the ILA in 1993 invoked a harsh, grim tone to warn of
Congress’s aﬀront to individual rights: “If Congress sent one message to America’s gun owners in 1993 it
was...‘YOU ARE THE ENEMY.’ Indeed, hearing Congress rant and rave about gun control in recent weeks
was enough to make any freedom-loving American sick.”43 After Congressional passage of the Brady Bill
and the Assault Weapons Ban in 1993 and 1994, both chambers of Congress switched from Democratic to
Republican control, a point not lost on then President Clinton: “I still believe if you analyze [the 1994 House
Congressional elections] race by race by race, the House of Representatives is in Republican hands today
because we took on the Brady Bill and the assault weapons ban. And everybody knew they were unpopular.
People said to me, don’t do this, there’s a reason no president has ever taken on the NRA; there’s a reason
39See Spitzer, supra note 12, at 84 n.46.
40See id. at 79.
41Id. at 81.
42Id. at 82.
43Quoted at id. 73.
15for this.”44
The NRA’s institutionalized lobbying and fundraising programs enjoy a signiﬁcant advantage over the rel-
atively weak pro-gun control single interest groups. Drawing upon the appeal of individual rights and the
fervor of gun owners, gun rights groups contributed $3,967,560 and $2,773,045 in the 2000 and 2002 election
cycles respectively, compared to just $403,814 and $118,356 in contributions from gun control advocates in
the same periods.45 The National Riﬂe Association alone accounted for $3,139,946 in campaign contributions
in the 2000 election cycle,46 following the post-Columbine attempts to pass gun control legislation, while the
Handgun Control Institute (“HCI”), the pre-eminent gun control advocacy group, mustered only $403,114
in contributions during the same time.47 In 2002, the Brady Campaign’s political contributions were less
than 6% of what the NRA contributed,48 and in the 1994 elections, those that immediately followed passage
of the Brady Bill and the Assault Weapons Ban, HCI contributions to candidates were less than 10% of
those made by the NRA.49 The NRA has translated the fervent support of gun owners and individual rights’
activists into a clear and decisive ﬁnancial and political advantage over the leading advocates for gun control,
despite the general majority public support for gun control discussed below.
44Quoted at Mark Barnes, Taking Aim: The Impetus Driving Suits Against Gun Manufacturers, 27 Pepp. L. Rev. 735, 736
(2000).
45Center for Responsive Politics, Gun Rights: Long-Term Contribution Trends, at
http://www.crp.org/industries/indus.asp?Ind=Q13; Center for Responsive Politics, Gun Control: Long-Term Contribu-
tion Trends, Center for Responsive Politics, at http://www.crp.org/industries/indus.asp?ind=Q12 (last accessed April 16,
2005).
46Center for Responsive Politics, Gun Rights: Top Contributors to Federal Candidates and Parties 2000, at
http://www.crp.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=Q13&Cycle=2000 (last accessed April 21, 2005).
47Center for Responsive Politics, Gun Control: Top Contributors to Federal Candidates and Parties 2000, at
http://www.crp.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=Q12&Cycle=2000 (last accessed April 21, 2005).
48In that period, the NRA contributed $2,027,889 while HCI managed only $118,856. Center
for Responsive Politics, Gun Rights: Top Contributors to Federal Candidates and Parties 2002, at
http://www.crp.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=Q13&Cycle=2002 (last accessed April 21, 2005), and Gun Control: Top
Contributors to Federal Candidates and Parties 2002, at http://www.crp.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=Q12&Cycle=2002
(last accessed April 21, 2005).
49In that period, the NRA contributed $2,222,238 while HCI managed only $220,441. Center
for Responsive Politics, Gun Rights: Top Contributors to Federal Candidates and Parties 1994, at
http://www.crp.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=Q13&Cycle=1994 (last accessed April 21, 2005), and Gun Control: Top
Contributors to Federal Candidates and Parties 1994, at http://www.crp.org/industries/contrib.asp?Ind=Q12&Cycle=1994
(last accessed April 21, 2005).
16Further, the NRA’s successful brand of politics has made it largely unwilling to compromise, even in the face
of high-proﬁle shootings that have drawn widespread attention to the use of guns in violent acts. The typical
unwillingness of the NRA to compromise leads scholars to brand them as a “law busting” group,50 and the
group has concentrated tremendous resources and pressure towards ﬁghting all gun controls. Compromise is
viewed as merely a step inviting more gun control.51 In the rare instances when compromise seems possible,
as in the post-Columbine Gun Show Bill, the NRA seeks to capitalize upon other political factors that may
prevent such compromise from being reached.
3. Public Opinion Outpaces Policy Outcomes
Gun control is an issue where the public consistently has been out in front of the politicians. This support
predictably varies by type of restriction, as those that impose little cost on individual rights receive the
greatest support while those that potentially interfere with gun possession receive more opposition.52 At the
start of the 1990s, a majority of the public favored a semi-automatic weapons ban (69%), a federal ban on
plastic guns (75%), licensing to own a handgun (74%), and registration of all guns (ranging from 65% to 84%
based upon weapon type).53 This support strengthened in recent years following a series of high-proﬁle gun
incidents and the passage of federal gun control legislation in the 103rd Congress. Around the time of the
Columbine shootings, a February 1999 Gallup poll indicated 83% of the public favored measures to institute
background checks at gun shows,54 and a Gallup poll taken the week of the June 1999 House vote on the
Gun Show Bill showed 87% supported the proposed background checks, 85% supported a requirement for
50Osha Gray Davidson, Under Fire: The NRA and the Battle for Gun Control 53 (1998).
51Id. at 130.
52Gary Kleck, Point Blank: Guns and Violence in America 369 (1991).
53See id. at 379-80.
54Frank Newport, Gun Control Support Increases Modestly in Wake of Littleton Tragedy, Gallup News Service, at
http://www.gallup.com (May 3, 1999).
17safety locks to accompany all new guns, and 68% endorsed the import ban on high-ammunition clips.55 The
result is a clear disconnect between the broad public’s general policy preferences and the limited restrictions
on gun sales and manufacturers.
4. Incremental Policy Decisions in Congress
Despite these factors that have frustrated advancements for gun control advocates, Congress has occasionally
reached agreement on legislation imposing tighter restrictions on gun manufacturers and gun sellers. Most
notably, Congress passed the Gun Control Act of 1968 ﬁve years after ﬁrst considering the bill in committee
and after the assassination of President Kennedy drew further attention to the problems associated with
mail order guns.56 The resulting legislation prohibited interstate gun sales to private individuals; required
gun dealers to attain a license and strengthened their record-keeping requirements; banned gun sales to
minors, drug addicts, and those with mental deﬁciencies; and increased the severity of penalties for using
gun in committing federal crimes.57 Stripped from the bill were provisions requiring blanket registration
and licensing, which the NRA condemned as a threat to individual liberty under the Second Amendment.
Even the relatively weak Gun Control Act of 1968 could not withstand changes in the membership of
Congress, and in 1986 the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act loosened some of the restrictions on gun dealers.
That statute permitted interstate sales of riﬂes and shotguns as long as they were not prohibited by other
55Frank Newport, Americans Support Wide Variety of Gun Control Measures, Gallup News Service, at www.gallup.com
(June 16, 1999).
56Spitzer, supra note 12, at 112.
57Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968). See also Harry Henderson, Gun Control 92-93
(2000); Spitzer, supra note 12, at 115.
18law, and it eliminated some record-keeping requirements for ammunition dealers which eﬀectively enabled
individuals to sell guns without a license.58 Congress went further by explicitly prohibiting the ATF from
issuing regulations that would impose requirements for centralized record-keeping by gun dealers, limiting
the ATF to just one unannounced inspection of gun dealers per year, and blocking the creation of any com-
prehensive ﬁrearms registration system.59 By preventing a bureaucratic agency from imposing its authority
on the gun industry, Congress was retaining full control in its hands and reinforcing the strength of the
NRA by not forcing it to lobby on another front. This is quite similar to the story of tobacco politics from
the 1960s to the 1990s, as explained in the next section. More importantly, it opened up the ATF to the
criticisms that it most commonly faces—that it does not properly enforce the laws that are on the books.60
Enforcement is quite diﬃcult when Congress has severely restricted what the agency can do to develop
eﬀective enforcement techniques.
The NRA exposed some vulnerability in the period immediately after the Firearms Owners’ Protection Act
was signed into law that enabled Congress to pass two additional gun control measures, the largest victories to
date for gun control advocates. First, Congress in 1986 also passed the Law Enforcement Oﬃcers Protection
Act, which amended the Gun Control Act of 1968 by banning the general manufacture or importation of
“cop-killer” bullets that were capable of penetrating bulletproof vests.61 Taking a strong slippery slope
stance, worried that any gun control regulation was a step towards a complete ban on gun ownership, the
NRA opposed the measure and in the process clashed with law enforcement oﬃcers from around the country.
58Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449 (1986). See also Henderson, supra note 57, at 94;
Spitzer, supra note 12, at 118.
59Firearms Owners’ Protection Act § 103, 18 U.S.C. § 923 (2004). See also Spitzer, supra note 12, at 118.
60See Martinek, Meier, and Keiser, supra note 36, at 17.
61Pub. L. No. 99-408, §§ 1-2, 100 Stat. 920 (1986), codiﬁed at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-922 (2004). See also Henderson, supra note
57, at 95.
19“The conﬂict between the two groups has led disappointingly, to the NRA’s use of propaganda and strong-
arm tactics against police agencies and individuals.”62 In trying to embarrass individual police oﬃcers and
attacking their positions on ﬁrearms and drugs, the NRA alienated a core constituency and oﬀended many
ordinary citizens who were otherwise sympathetic to the group’s focus on individual rights.63
At the same time that the NRA was experiencing a period of weakness, several focusing events again captured
Congress’s attention on the issue of gun crimes. In January 1989, twenty-four year old Patrick Purdy entered
a crowded schoolyard at Cleveland Elementary School in Stockton, California and ﬁred shots from an AK-47
assault riﬂe he purchased in Oregon and that had been manufactured in China. He killed ﬁve students
and wounded 33 in the barrage. Two years later, the worst domestic massacre in U.S. history occurred in
a Killeen, Texas cafeteria when George J. Hennard gunned down 22 and wounded 33 using two pistols.64
These events were accompanied by the election of a Democratic president in 1992 who was willing to push
for some gun control measures. With the additional tragic shooting on a Long Island commuter train in
1993, gun control proponents had enough momentum to ﬁnally gain passage of two modest bills.
On November 30, 1993, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act was signed into law by President
Clinton.65 The Brady Bill required a ﬁve-business-day waiting period on handgun purchases, which provided
time for state and local police to make a “reasonable eﬀort” to run background checks on potential gun
buyers. The bill also authorized federal funds for states to upgrade the computerization of criminal records
62Jesse Matthew Ruhl, Arthur L. Rizer III, and Mikel J. Wier, Gun Control: Targeting Rationality in a Loaded Debate, 13-
SPG Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 413, 426 (2004). The authors suggest that there was a great deal of misinformation surrounding
the “cop-killer” debate, and that the NRA’s political position may not have been entirely oﬀ base. The term “cop-killer” was
ﬁrst used on an NBC feature story on the bullet, which was designed for police use and was capable of penetrating a Kevlar
vest. However, the authors point out that “there has never been any evidence that a law enforcement oﬃcer was killed by
‘cop-killer’ bullets penetrating a Kevlar vest” and that most riﬂe bullets can penetrate such vests by their sheer velocity. See
id. at 422-23.
63Id. at 427.
64See Spitzer, supra note 12, at 120-21.
65Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536 (1993).
20and raise license fees for federal ﬁrearms.66 Following this, in 1994 Congress passed an assault weapons
ban, codiﬁed as Title XI of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (“the Assault Weapons
Ban”).67 The law banned the sale and possession of nineteen speciﬁed types of weapons for a ten-year
period and other copycat weapons that possessed some of the characteristics of those banned weapons, but
speciﬁcally exempted 661 sporting riﬂes.68 Just last year, President George W. Bush and the Republican
controlled Congress permitted the Assault Weapons Ban to expire without renewing its restrictions. This
inaction exempliﬁed the marginal policy changes that gun control advocates have been able to win against
the backdrop of a powerful interest group, a constitutional amendment providing impetus for an individual
rights argument, a gun culture in the United States that celebrates, and not just tolerates, ﬁrearms, and
short windows for maintaining Congressional attention on the issue through short-lived focusing events.
5. Summary
Given the powerful pro-gun interest lobby that has opposed compromises that would trigger stricter gun
regulations and gun control proponents’ failure to translate broad public support for some reasonable gun
control restrictions and high-proﬁle incidents of gun violence into legislative outcomes, it is not surprising
that gun control advocates saw the courts as an alternative arena that might be more receptive to their
goals. Yet the same political factors that have combined to produce few restrictions on the gun industry
help explain the inability of public gun lawsuits to date to generate sweeping reforms.
66See Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act § 106, 42 U.S.C. § 3759, 18 U.S.C. § 922 Note (2004); see also Spitzer, supra
note 12, at 129.
67See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
68See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act §§ 110101-110106, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-924 (2004); see also Spitzer,
supra note 12, at 124.
21B. Traditional Tobacco Politics – 1950s to 1990s
With the exception of the inﬂuence of the Second Amendment, the same general principles that have come
to characterize gun control politics characterized tobacco politics for much of the post-New Deal era, until
the mid-1990s. For most of the history of tobacco production in the United States, Congress has kept its
hands oﬀ of the industry. The President has played little or no role in tobacco politics, and single interest
groups (particularly on the industry side) were adept at keeping tobacco out of general legislative grants
of administrative authority that might subject the industry to stricter regulation. Those seeking stronger
regulation of tobacco products have needed symbols to help galvanize any public support for more government
interference in the industry.
1. Changing Symbols Over Time – New Science
Like focusing events with gun control, the rise of tobacco regulation has depended upon symbolic changes in
the public view of the product that capture and hold the attention of the public at large and politicians. In
the gun control context, these events are usually ﬂeeting; however, the shift in public attention and attitudes
towards tobacco has been more consistent and more lasting because it has been produced by reports that
organize long-term research on the health eﬀects of smoking. The initial event that started to change the
public perception of smoking was the January 1964 release of a report by the U.S. Surgeon General’s Advisory
Committee on Smoking and Health (“the Surgeon General’s Report”) that concluded “cigarette smoking
22is a health hazard of suﬃcient importance in the United States to warrant appropriate remedial action.”69
The report directly advocated for government regulation and served to ignite a political struggle over the
appropriate remedy for a recognized problem.70 This avoided the initial question that confronts gun control
advocates—whether government regulation is necessary at all. Government reports on gun control might
advance diﬀerent assessments of whether federal regulation is necessary to reduce gun violence, or whether
more liberal gun laws would actually decrease gun violence, but the Surgeon General’s Report made clear
that smoking was harmful and the only way to reduce those eﬀects is to get smokers to stop smoking.
The tobacco industry was not taking the mounting science lying down, and instead industry leaders coordi-
nated their eﬀorts by forming the Tobacco Institute in the 1950s to organize the industry’s political activities
and its public response to published evidence linking smoking to lung cancer.71 Around the same time, the
industry created the Council for Tobacco Research out of the pre-existing Tobacco Industry Research Com-
mittee, and used the group to raise money and distribute it for research grants, with the aim that research
would demonstrate the weaknesses in the growing body of research linking smoking to cancer. 72 These
immediate responses were for a long time successful at keeping Congress from imposing severe restrictions
on the tobacco industry.
2. Congressional Protection of the Tobacco Industry
69Derthick, supra note 4, at 10 (quoting the 1964 Surgeon General report).
70See id. at 11.
71See id. at 35-36.
72See id. at 33-36.
23In response to the Surgeon General’s Report, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) opened hearings
designed to regulate the tobacco industry, and the tobacco industry’s largely successful rebuﬀ of the FTC’s
actions typiﬁes the marginal politics of social regulatory policy. In 1964 the FTC opened hearings on
promulgating a rule designed to require a health warning on cigarette packages. The tobacco industry failed
to appear but sent lawyer representatives, who rebuked the FTC for initiating rulemaking without suﬃcient
statutory authority, prompting a request from a House committee chairman that the FTC postpone action
until Congress had a chance to consider the matter.73 In Congress, the tobacco industry could bring to bear
the lobbying inﬂuence of its Tobacco Institute, and it was able to soften the initial FTC proposal. In 1965
Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”),74 which was limited to
placing “Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health” on cigarette cartons and packs as
the ﬁrst mandatory health warning about cigarettes.75 In a slap to the FTC, Congress refused to apply the
warning to any advertising by the tobacco industry, and it explicitly prohibited the FTC from taking any
regulatory action with respect to cigarette advertising until the law expired on July 1, 1969.76 Some in the
tobacco industry even considered the legislation a blessing in disguise because the warning label provided a
measure of insulation from liability.77
This example demonstrates another important feature of tobacco politics until the 1990s as well. Even
as Congress passed some laws that encroached upon the tobacco industry to some degree, it speciﬁcally
omitted cigarettes from most general legislation that empowered federal agencies to regulate hazardous or
toxic substances. For example, Congress explicitly exempted tobacco products from the Fair Packing and
73See id. at 12.
7415 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (2004).
75Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965).
76Derthick, supra note 4, at 13.
77Id.
24Labeling Act of 1966,78 the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,79 the Consumer
Product Safety Act amendments of 1976,80 the Federal Hazardous Substances Act amendments of 1976,81
and the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976.82 Indeed Congress had long granted explicit statutory
protection to tobacco products in stating “[t]he marketing of tobacco constitutes one of the greatest basic
industries of the United States with ramifying activities which directly aﬀect interstate and foreign commerce
at every point, and stable conditions therein are necessary to the general welfare.”83 Moreover, Congress
rejected giving FDA express jurisdiction over tobacco prior to passing the FCLAA.84
This pattern is similar in the issue of gun control, where Congress explicitly exempted guns and ammunition
from the jurisdiction of the Consumer Product Safety Commission (“CPSC”) under the Consumer Product
Safety Act.85 Even when a court held that the CPSC had the authority to consider a ban on small-arms
ammunition under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act, the CPSC believed such a ban would conﬂict
with Congress’s intent and refused to institute it.86 If the CPSC had taken such an entrepreneurial step,
Congress stood ready to explicitly deny the Commission such authority.
In these situations, the tobacco industry’s strong lobbying presence and its economic power enabled it to
keep control over tobacco regulation in the hands of Congress, where legislation is fairly diﬃcult to pass,
rather than allow it to be delegated to an agency that might exercise that power in ways that could be
78Pub. L. No. 89-755, § 10, 80 Stat. 1296 (1966).
79Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 § 102, 21 U.S.C. § 802 (2004).
8015 U.S.C. § 2052 (2004).
8115 U.S.C. § 1261(f)(2) (2004).
82Toxic Substances Control Act § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 2602 (2004); see also Derthick, supra note 4, at 14.
83Law of Feb. 6, 1938, ch. 30, § 311, 52 Stat. 45 (repealed 2004) (formerly codiﬁed at 7 U.S.C. § 1311(a)). See also FDA v.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 137 (2000).
84See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 147-48. Representative Udall introduced a bill to amend the Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act “to make that Act applicable to smoking products” in April 1963 and again in January 1965, and Senator Moss
introduced an identical bill in the Senate in June 1963, but the proposals all ultimately died in Congress.
8515 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1)(E) (2004).
86Comm. for Handgun Control, Inc., v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 388 F. Supp. 216, 218-20 (D.D.C. 1974).
25harder to inﬂuence. Like the gun industry, for a long time the tobacco industry was able to avoid having an
agency challenge its politically protected status.
3. Marginal Regulatory Policy through Legislative Steps
It would be a mistake to assume that during the ﬁrst thirty years after the 1964 Surgeon General’s report
that Congress failed to take any steps to regulate the tobacco industry. As it did with gun control, Congress
took some incremental steps to impose regulations upon the tobacco industry, even while it protected the
industry from more aggressive action by the CPSC or FDA. Many of the new regulations were limited
to adjusting the warning label on cigarette packages. First, Congress toughened the warning on cigarette
packs and cartons, changing the “may be hazardous” language from the FCLAA to “Warning: The Surgeon
General Has Determined that Cigarette Smoking Is Dangerous to Your Health.”87 Later, in 1984, Congress
approved four new surgeon general warnings to be rotated on packages.88 Not until 1988 did Congress
impose a ban on smoking; it started by banning smoking on domestic airline ﬂights shorter than two hours
and then extended that ban to all domestic airline ﬂights in 1990.89 In its most aggressive action, in 1992
Congress linked state aid for mental health and drug and alcohol abuse programs to a state’s enforcement
of its state laws prohibiting the sale of tobacco products to minors.90
87Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (emphasis added). See also Derthick, supra note 4, at 15 (emphasis added).
88Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 4, 98 Stat. 2200 (1984), codiﬁed at 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (2004). The four warnings are: “Smoking
Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.”; “Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces
Serious Risks to Your Health.”; “Smoking by Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth
Weight.”; and “Cigarette Smoking Contains Carbon Monoxide.” See also Derthick, supra note 4, at 15.
89Pub. L. No. 101-164, § 335, 103 Stat. 1069 (1990). The language now in eﬀect is at 49 U.S.C. § 41706 (2004).
90See Derthick, supra note 4, at 15.
26Three critical political elements combined to drive the noticeably more aggressive Congressional involvement
in tobacco regulation in the 1980s after restricting itself to labeling for the ﬁrst twenty years after the
hallmark Surgeon General’s report. First, the tobacco lobby suﬀered from poor leadership in the 1980s.
During the consideration of the labeling bill of 1984, “the tobacco lobby committed a series of blunders,
including refusal to compromise, going back on its word, and making false claims about commitments from
members of Congress.”91 As the NRA had during the 1986 cop-killer bullet debate, the Tobacco Institute had
made some critical decisions that alienated important congressional actors and diminished its appearance of
invincibility.
At the same time, the opponents of big tobacco joined forces to start a lobbying group that could counter
the Tobacco Institute. The American Cancer Society, the American Lung Association, and the American
Heart Association joined forces to create the Coalition on Smoking OR Health, which was headed by a single
person who could eﬀectively coordinate the three groups’ resources on the perceived enemy of cigarettes.92
This venture marks a distinction in tobacco politics from gun control politics, where gun control advocates
have lacked a strong lobbying force to counter the inﬂuence of the NRA. While the NRA “has evolved into
the unoﬃcial trade association for the ﬁrearms industry,”93 neither of the two preeminent pro-gun control
lobbying forces in Washington, the Handgun Control Institute (“HCI”) (also known as the Brady Campaign)
and the Coalition to Stop Handgun Violence, has been able to muster sustained pressure. Whereas the health
groups have a strong constituency among the medical professions, the anti-gun groups lack the sustained
political support necessary to match the intensity of NRA supporters.94 By contrast, in the tobacco realm,
91Id. at 19; see also Michael Pertschuk, Giant Killers (1986) (providing a behind-the-scenes account of the lobbying on
the 1984 labeling bill).
92Derthick, supra note 4, at 19-20.
93Josh Sugarmann, National Rifle Association: Money, Firepower and Fear 87 (1992).
94A good example of gun control’s failure to sustain institutional pressure is the Million Mom March (“MMM”) in 2000. In
27the Coalition on Smoking OR Health was a signiﬁcant player in the legislative pressure that preceded the
tobacco lawsuits of the 1990s.
Finally, public opinion on tobacco consumption was changing slowly over time, welcoming more regulation.
With the two aforementioned political changes and a Congress that recognized the shifts in public opinion
and the weakening of the tobacco lobby, anti-smoking advocates could take advantage of the general approval
for limits on the tobacco industry. National consumption of cigarettes dropped during the 1980s,95 and by
1981, 83% of respondents to a national poll believed that cigarettes caused cancer.96 Congress itself became
more receptive to regulation, as more aggressive legislators like Henry Waxman of California took control of
inﬂuential committee chair positions; the legislature’s willingness to impose additional limited restrictions
on the tobacco industry was the culmination of chinks in the armor of the tobacco lobby, growing public
support for regulation, and the coalescing of that support in the form of the well-resourced Coalition on
Smoking OR Health.
III. The Interplay of Politics and Law in Tobacco – Tobacco Litigation
response to the Columbine shootings, 700,000 women marched on Washington on Mother’s Day and set forth an ambitious
agenda of six regulatory and administrative goals – cooling oﬀ periods and background checks for gun purchases; registration
of all handguns and licensing of owners; safety locks on all handguns; limiting individuals to the purchase of one handgun
per month; strict enforcement of existing gun laws; and assistance from corporate America. Following the march, the MMM
Foundation was created as 240 MMM chapters opened their doors in 46 states to capitalize on the success of the event and
sustain the pressure. Ultimately the MMM Foundation failed to sustain its grassroots campaign, closed most of its oﬃces, laid
oﬀ most of its personnel, and folded into the Brady Campaign. The MMM Foundation was unable to make signiﬁcant progress
on any of its six stated goals. See Spitzer, supra note 12, at 96-97.
95See Derthick, supra note 4, at 20.
96See Lydia Saad, A Half-Century of Polling on Tobacco: Most Don’t Like Smoking But Tolerate It, The Pub. Perspective,
Aug.-Sept. 1998, at 3.
28Still, the changes in the political dynamic for tobacco regulation were not suﬃcient to appease anti-smoking
advocates who were seeking to put more pressure on a weakened tobacco industry and were tiring of the
slow progress being made through the traditional law-making process. In the 1990s, anti-smoking advocates
charted a new course through the courts that sought to impose legal liability on tobacco companies for the
damage that smoking caused over a lifetime. These damages were more than disease incurred by individuals
who smoked; for states, they were ﬁnancial losses associated with using state treasury funds to support those
who suﬀered the long-term health eﬀects of smoking.
Some commentators have termed the approach of state and class action lawsuits against tobacco companies
to be “adversarial legalism”97 or “entrepreneurial litigation.”98 Most have been critical of the approach.
Entrepreneurial litigation is a derogatory term for “a weak lawsuit with a low probability of success ex ante
ﬁled in the expectation of extracting a quick, lucrative settlement.”99 Other commentators have termed
the approach “legigation,” referring to lawsuits ﬁled or threatened by government against industry after
legislative attempts to tax or regulate the industry have failed.100 Most are highly suspicious of such lawsuits,
criticizing them for being of dubious legal merit; “...their purpose is not to win a legal victory, but instead to
coerce industries to submit to regulation or taxation through the threats of protected litigation and ruinous
damages posed by a federal suit.”101 Even prominent liberal thinker and former Secretary of Labor Robert
Reich has condemned the phenomenon of attacking big industry through government-sponsored lawsuits as
“blatant end-runs around the democratic process” meant to coerce settlement from the fear of large penalties
97See e.g. Derthick, supra note 4, at 72.
98Little, supra note 3, at 1167.
99Little, supra note 3, at 1167.
100See e.g. Dawson, supra note 9, at 1728.
101Id. at 1728.
29before the legal validity of the lawsuits are subjected to full judicial scrutiny.102
Despite widespread criticism of the approach, in the context of tobacco it has led to a settlement between state
governments and industry that anti-smoking advocates regard as a win. At the same time, the approach has
failed to produce any clear victory for gun control advocates, and holds little hope of producing any settlement
approaching the breadth and scope of the MSA. Understanding four critical political and legal elements of the
tobacco lawsuits explains the diﬀerence in the success for the government plaintiﬀs in the two diﬀerent issue
arenas. First, the tobacco industry’s vulnerability was exposed in important early legal decisions allowing the
novel tort theories to proceed, and that provided an impetus for an onslaught of similar suits in state courts
across the country. Second, the tobacco industry’s public image was tarnished by evidence of tampering
and manipulation for which they were viliﬁed in court documents and in the public arena, making judges
and politicians far less sympathetic to their cause. Third, this insider evidence helped the Food and Drug
Administration to sustain a regulatory attack on the industry that was relatively unchallenged by Congress.
While FDA’s attempt to regulate cigarettes ultimately was invalidated by the Supreme Court, the fact that a
bureaucracy had successfully challenged the industry without political interference marked a clear shift from
the traditional politics of Congressional protection for tobacco from administrative agencies, and opened up
a new front that the tobacco lobby had to ﬁght. Finally, some states changed their statutes to make it easier
to sue the tobacco industry, marking a notable shift in the politics of tobacco that reinforced the preceding
three factors. Thus, adversarial legalism in the tobacco context reﬂects, and has beneﬁted from, marked
shifts in the political environment, which have consequently improved the likelihood of success for public
entity plaintiﬀs.
102Quoted in Little, supra note 3, at 1144.
30A. Early Litigation Successes
On May 23, 1994, Mississippi Attorney General Mike Moore ﬁled the ﬁrst public lawsuit against the tobacco
industry on theories of unjust enrichment for tobacco companies, seeking restitution of the state-paid medical
costs under Medicaid for citizens suﬀering the health eﬀects from smoking cigarettes, and seeking damages
under public nuisance theories for “intentionally and unreasonably interfer[ing] with the public’s right to be
free from unwarranted injury, disease and sickness....”103 By May 31, 1997, thirty-two states had joined
Mississippi in suing the tobacco industry.104 Under existing precedent, the lawsuits looked precarious at best.
In United States v. Standard Oil Co. of California, the Supreme Court had rejected a claim by the federal
government to recover the medical and other costs it had incurred in providing care to a soldier injured by one
of Standard Oil’s trucks.105 The Court held that a novel recoupment theory would have to be authorized by
Congress.106 While federal law would not govern in the state lawsuits against the tobacco industry, Standard
Oil provided some comfort to the tobacco industries that courts would look disapprovingly on lawsuits seeking
recoupment absent clear direction and intent expressed through legislation or court precedent.107 Moreover,
103Complaint at paragraphs 78-83, 90, Moore v. American Tobacco Co. (Chancery Court of Jackson County, MS) (No.
94-1429), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/ms/2moore.html (last accessed March 30, 2005).
104The thirty-two states who brought Medicaid suits against the tobacco industry by March 31, 1997 were: Mississippi (May
23, 1994), Minnesota (August 17, 1994), West Virginia (September 20, 1994), Florida (February 21, 1995), Massachusetts
(December 19, 1995), Louisiana (March 13, 1996), Texas (March 28, 1996), Maryland (May 1, 1996), Washington (June 5,
1996), Connecticut (July 18, 1996), Kansas (August 20, 1996), Michigan (August 21, 1996), Oklahoma (August 22, 1996), New
Jersey (September 10, 1996), Utah (September 30, 1996), Alabama (October 17, 1996), Illinois (November 12, 1996), Iowa
(November 27, 1996), New York (January 27, 1997), Hawaii (January 31, 1997), Wisconsin (February 5, 1997), Indiana (Febru-
ary 19, 1997), Alaska (April 14, 1997), Pennsylvania (April 22, 1997), Montana (May 5, 1997), Arkansas (May 5, 1997), Ohio
(May 8, 1997), South Carolina (May 9, 1997), Missouri (May 10, 1997), Nevada (May 21, 1997), New Mexico (May 27, 1997),
and Vermont (May 29, 1997). Further, the Florida legislature passed a law making it easier for the state to sue the tobacco
industry for Medicaid costs in December, 1994. See Frontline: Inside the Tobacco Deal, States’ Medicaid Lawsuits, available at
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/settlement/timelines/medicaid.html (last accessed March 30, 2005); Tobacco Con-
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(last accessed March 31, 2005).
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31traditional tort law theories dealt with the adjustment of private risks rather than the vindication of public
oﬀenses; they emanated from common law and were not designed to replace the legislature as the primary
policy-making body of the state.108 Thus, the prospects for the state attorneys general were initially grim.
However, some critical decisions made in the earliest lawsuits spurred the state litigation forward and started
an avalanche of lawsuits that ultimately had enough staying power to severely damage the tobacco industry.
In Mississippi, for example, Governor Kirk Fordice, a Republican, was outraged by the actions of the Demo-
cratic Attorney General and sought a writ of mandamus to block the lawsuit against the tobacco industry
from progressing and a declaratory judgment recognizing the Governor’s sole jurisdiction over Medicaid reim-
bursement lawsuits.109 Governor Fordice argued that he was vested with the duty to administer the Division
of Medicaid for Mississippi, that in carrying forth that duty he had the exclusive authority to appoint an
Executive Director of the state Medicaid program who was subject to the Governor’s direction and control,
and that the Division of Medicaid, rather than the Attorney General, had exclusive jurisdiction over any
claim for reimbursement.110 The Court rejected the Governor’s attempt to derail the tobacco litigation,
holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear a direct request for a writ of mandamus and a
declaratory judgment against an executive oﬃcial.111 Moreover, the Court declined to invoke discretionary
jurisdiction to hear the case, even though it considered the Attorney General’s actions “a matter of public
importance.”112 In so ruling, the Court was expressing a reluctance to interfere in the politics of the dispute
between the two leading executive oﬃcials of the state of Mississippi, and the tobacco lawsuit continued.
108For a critical discussion of private tort law’s misapplication in public lawsuits, see Michael I. Krauss, Fire & Smoke:
Government, Lawsuits, and the Rule of Law 3-4 (2000).
109See In re Fordice, 691 So. 2d 429 (Miss. 1997).
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32Further, the Mississippi Supreme Court refused to interfere with lower court decisions that had impinged the
ability of the tobacco industry to mount a full defense in the trial courts. After the chancery court judge ﬁrst
denied an industry motion for judgment on the pleadings in the Medicaid lawsuit, and then rejected a motion
for partial summary judgment in which tobacco companies had argued that the Attorney General lacked
authority to sue for reimbursement of Medicaid funds, the tobacco industry ﬁled a request for interlocutory
relief in the state supreme court to correct what it termed “clear errors of law.”113 The highest state court
essentially extended the time and cost of litigation for the tobacco companies, and the likelihood of success
for the state plaintiﬀs, by ruling that the tobacco industries had not shown extraordinary circumstances that
would warrant interlocutory relief.114 It refused to settle the issue of whether the Attorney General or the
Governor had authority to sue, delaying the question to a future appeal on the merits of a trial below. The
Court expressed frustration with the tobacco defendants, stating that “[the companies’] attempt to attack
interlocutory decisions made many months ago weighs heavily against them.”115 As a result, the tobacco
industry was faced with a possible full trial before a trial judge who had ruled against the industry on all of its
preliminary motions and who seemed unreceptive to its plight. And at trial, the industry would have to face
the revelation of damaging documents outlining its blatant attempts to mislead the public and to manipulate
its products to enhance the addictive nature of tobacco products. Such revelations were unlikely to play
well before a jury. By refusing to allow the legal process to settle what was essentially a political dispute,
the Mississippi state courts had emboldened state plaintiﬀs and had isolated the tobacco industry from the
political cover it had enjoyed for most of the 1960s through 1990s in Congress and the state legislatures.
113In re Corr-Williams Tobacco Co., 691 So. 2d 424, 426 (Miss. 1997).
114Id. at 427.
115Id.
33Another example of the importance of early court decisions is from the Massachusetts lawsuit against the
tobacco industry,116 where the industry was unable to use federal law to protect itself. First, the industry
lost its bid to remove the lawsuit to federal court when the district court judge ruled that there was no
federal question at stake in the lawsuit.117 Then, when the industry ﬁled a preemptive suit in federal
court against the Massachusetts Attorney General seeking to block the Commonwealth’s Medicaid lawsuit
against the tobacco companies on grounds that it violated several federal constitutional provisions, the court
abstained until the state court had had time to consider the state law issues at stake in the case.118 The court
noted: “[t]he state suit at issue seems to be founded on a new cause or causes of action the precise nature
and reach of which are not clear. It is appropriate to have the novel issues raised by the Massachusetts
complaint construed as a matter of state law before subjecting them to constitutional test.”119 These
decisions prevented a quick dismissal of the lawsuits and kept the matter in front of a state court judge
receptive to an expansive discovery process that threatened to expose the industry’s manipulative practices.
Further, Massachusetts passed a state law that required cigarette manufacturers provide the Department of
Public Health with information about the ingredients and nicotine content of their cigarettes,120 which was
initially upheld against a challenge that it was preempted by federal law.121 With the industry under siege,
the courts were extending the companies’ pain by prolonging the lawsuits and setting the stage for trials,
where the defendants faced a risk of extremely large damage awards against them. The paths of litigation
in Massachusetts and in Mississippi were indicative of what was transpiring in many state courts around the
country with respect to the tobacco lawsuits.
116Complaint, Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Superior Ct of Middlesex County, MA) (No. 95-7378) (ﬁled Dec. 19,
1995), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/ma/8macomplaint.html (last accessed March 31, 2005).
117Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Philip Morris, Inc., 942 F. Supp. 640 (D. Mass. 1996).
118Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, 946 F. Supp. 1047 (D. Mass. 1996).
119Id. at 1079.
120Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 307B (held unconstitutional in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (en
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121Philip Morris, Inc. v. Harshbarger, No. 96-11599-GAO, 1997 WL 106930 (D. Mass. Feb. 7, 1997).
34B. The Damaging Documents
State plaintiﬀs’ ability to win many preliminary legal battles sparked the tobacco lobby to seriously consider
settling some of the cases. But the pressure to settle was also largely driven by the revelation during the
1990s of insider documents that were damaging to the industry’s legal defenses. Ironically, the discovery
of these documents was partly a consequence of a lawsuit that the industry had won years before against
a private plaintiﬀ. In 1983, a New Jersey woman sued the Liggett Group alleging that she had developed
lung cancer from smoking the company’s cigarettes. She made claims under New Jersey law based upon
theories of strict liability, negligence, express warranty, and intentional tort.122 The Third Circuit ruled
that the FCLAA and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 preempted the allegations based on
the defendants’ advertising, promotion, and public relations activities after January 1, 1966.123 Then the
Supreme Court overturned a jury verdict against the industry on the remaining claims under a preemption
analysis.124 Yet this case weakened the tobacco industry in two important respects.
First, the Supreme Court held open the possibility that the tobacco industry could face lawsuits under state
law claims that were not pre-empted by the FCLAA. Speciﬁcally, the Court preserved claims “based upon
the manufacturer’s failure to use demonstrably safer alternative designs for cigarettes.”125 Strict liability,
express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, and conspiracy all constituted valid bases for state
122Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
123See John F. Vargo & J.D. Lee, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.: U.S. Supreme Court Opens the Door to
Tobacco Lawsuits 8 (1992).
124Cipollone, 505 U.S. 504; Dawson, supra note 9, at 1730; Vargo & Lee, supra note 123, at 8.
125Vargo & Lee, supra note 123, at 15.
35law claims according to the Court’s interpretation of the FCLAA, refusing to read the statute as blanket
protection for the tobacco industry.126 This provided an impetus for state lawsuits to crawl out from the
shadow of Standard Oil, establishing some legal merit to the tort lawsuits ﬁled by state attorneys general in
the years immediately following the case.
Perhaps more importantly, the Cipollone case opened up the tobacco companies to discovery requests and
yielded a far more important contribution to ensuing state and private litigation—documents that ultimately
revealed that the tobacco industry was aware of the long-term eﬀects of smoking and had deliberately sought
to increase the addictive element of nicotine in cigarettes marketed around the country.127 In the face of
mounting Congressional pressure, top representatives from the tobacco industry had sworn before a House
subcommittee on April 14, 1994 that they did not believe nicotine was addictive. Yet their testimony
contradicted many studies demonstrating a link between nicotine and addiction and research that the tobacco
industry had partially funded that concluded that cigarette smoking played a role in lung cancer and heart
disease.128 And that moment became a paradigmatic symbol for anti-smoking advocates that the tobacco
lobby had engaged in an extensive and deliberate ruse designed to defraud the American public for the
beneﬁt of the company’s own pockets. The revelations that emerged created a ﬂood of negative publicity
and condemned the industry in the realm of public opinion, where it might otherwise have garnered some
sympathy for the argument that the long arm of the government was choking oﬀ American enterprise.
A close look at the early litigation reveals that internal documents, obtained from the discovery requests in the
126See Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 530-31; see also Dawson, supra note 9, at 1730.
127See Derthick, supra note 4, at 101-03.
128Little, supra note 3, at 1146-47.
36Cipollone case and from industry insiders like Jeﬀrey Wigand, the former head of research and development
at Brown & Williamson who hinted to FDA that the tobacco industry had spent resources honing a nicotine-
enriched tobacco product called “Y-1” and experimented with ammonia additives to facilitate the release of
nicotine,129 were critical to the legal arguments brought against the industry. For example, the Attorney
General of Mississippi’s lawsuit relied extensively upon memos and documents from the tobacco industry
in framing its complaint. The state Attorney General alleged that “[a]n internal tobacco industry memo
acknowledged in 1972: ‘[w]ithout nicotine...there would be no smoking ...the cigarette [is] a dispenser for a
dose unit of nicotine.”’130 The complaint also highlighted that the industry had engaged in a public relations
oﬀensive in response to a 1953 report, issued to tobacco companies and scientists establishing a “deﬁnitive
link between cigarette smoking and cancer,” in an eﬀort to undermine the scientiﬁc research and to defraud
consumers.131 The Mississippi trial lawyers beneﬁted greatly from Brown & Williamson documents that they
had obtained from a former paralegal for a Kentucky law ﬁrm that represented Brown & Williamson, which
contained information about Brown & Williamson’s attempt to sustain nicotine delivery while reducing the
consumption of tar from cigarettes.132 Of particular damage to the company was a statement by its general
counsel that “[w]e are, then, in the business of selling nicotine, an addictive drug....”133
Other states also capitalized upon the industry’s refusal to budge from its public position that it did not know
that nicotine was addictive in the face of internal documents to the contrary. For example, Massachusetts
speciﬁcally highlighted the April 1994 Congressional testimony of tobacco representatives, and contrasted
129Derthick, supra note 4, at 58-59.
130Complaint at paragraph 58, Moore v. American Tobacco Co. (Chancery Court of Jackson County, MS) (No. 94-1429),
available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/ms/2moore.html (last accessed March 30, 2005).
131See id. at paragraphs 41-43.
132Derthick, supra note 4, at 60.
133See id. at 60, 60 n.25 (quoting from the Brown & Williamson papers, published in Stanton A. Glantz et al., The
Cigarette Papers 15, 74, 101 (1996)).
37that with industry documents from the 1960s that revealed cigarettes were carcinogenic and that nicotine was
addictive.134 Likewise, Minnesota used evidence from industry documents to lay out its conspiracy theory,
alleging the tobacco industry had long known of the eﬀects of smoking and the addictive nature of nicotine
but continued to perpetrate a fraud on the American public.135 The complaints are remarkably similar across
the state jurisdictions, drawing upon the insider documents to support theories of a mass conspiracy on the
part of the tobacco industry. These revelations demonstrated that the industry had lied before Congress
and had deliberately misled the American public, provoking strong reaction from the public and from state
oﬃcials who were hungry to score political points by holding the tobacco companies accountable in court.
C. The Role of FDA
The disclosure of industry internal documents was also critical in leading then-FDA Commissioner David
Kessler to investigate the industry and ultimately assert legal jurisdiction to regulate cigarettes under the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (“FDCA”). On several previous occasions FDA had disclaimed
jurisdiction over tobacco,136 but Kessler felt the new documents and insider revelations might arm him with
a new legal theory for bringing nicotine under the ambit of the FDCA. FDA engaged in an extensive
investigation of the tobacco industry, receiving help from industry informants who were willing to talk
about industry manipulation of the nicotine in tobacco products.137 Kessler’s investigation built upon a
134Complaint at paragraphs 27-29, 55, 109, Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, Inc. (Superior Ct of Middlesex County, MA)
(No. 95-7378) (ﬁled Dec. 19, 1995), available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/ma/8macomplaint.html (last
accessed March 31, 2005).
135Complaint at paragraphs 57, 65, State v. Philip Morris, Inc. (D. Minn.) (Aug. 17, 1994), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/mn/3bcbs.html (last accessed March 31, 2005).
136FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 144 (2000).
137For a ﬁrst-hand account of FDA’s approach, see David Kessler, A Question of Intent: A Great American Battle
with a Deadly Industry (2001).
38revealing television episode of Day One, an ABC prime time show airing in February and March 1994 on
which an industry insider named Deep Cough revealed that tobacco companies were manipulating cigarette
levels.138 The agency’s approach imposed sustained political pressure on the tobacco industry, and contrary
to historical patterns in tobacco politics, the industry had few friends in Congress who were willing to shield
it from the reach of FDA. Prior to the fateful hearings of April 1994 at which tobacco representatives failed
to acknowledge their awareness of the addictive nature of nicotine, Congressman Tom Bliley (R-VA), a long-
time supporter of the industry, publicly warned the tobacco companies that if they refused to appear before
the House Subcommittee on Health and the Environment that he would not provide them any cover.139
Brieﬂy stated, FDA’s theory of jurisdiction rested upon the notion that tobacco products were combination
products—“a combination of a drug, device, or biological product”140—and thus fell within its authority
under the FDCA.141 It found that nicotine was a drug because it “intended to aﬀect the structure or any
function of the body”;142 the critical shift in FDA’s legal position was that the matter of intent was satisﬁed
because the eﬀects of nicotine were so widely known and foreseeable to the industry and consumers used
tobacco products almost exclusively to obtain the pharmacological eﬀects associated with the stimulant.143
In justifying this theory, FDA beneﬁted from industry documents obtained by products liability lawyers in
another case in which an R.J. Reynolds executive essentially conﬁrmed FDA’s allegations. The documents
revealed:
138See id. at 104-11, Derthick, supra note 4, at 110.
139Kessler, supra note 137, at 170.
14021 U.S.C. § 353(g)(1) (2004).
141Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 126.
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39Nicotine is known to be a habit-forming alkaloid, hence the conﬁrmed user of tobacco
products is primarily seeking the physiological ‘satisfaction’ derived from nicotine—and
perhaps other active compounds. Thus, a tobacco product is, in essence, a vehicle for
delivery of nicotine, designed to deliver the nicotine in a generally acceptable and attractive
form. Our industry is then based upon design, manufacture and sale of attractive dosage
forms of nicotine... 144
The combination of individual and class action lawsuits preceding the Medicaid ones ﬁled by the states,
and the fervent commitment of FDA to bring the industry within its ambit, yielded extensive public and
political pressure on the tobacco companies. FDA could now assert that the manufacturers’ “statements,
research, and actions...revealed that they ‘have designed cigarettes to provide pharmacologically active
doses of nicotine to consumers,”’ making cigarettes combination products because they deliver controlled
nicotine levels.145 Relying upon this interpretation of the drug provision of the FDCA, FDA promulgated
regulations that placed restrictions upon the promotion, labeling, and accessibility of tobacco products to
children.
In a controversial 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ultimately rejected FDA’s theory of jurisdiction.146
However, this result is not particularly important for understanding the tobacco companies’ motivation to
agree to settle the numerous outstanding Medicaid lawsuits. Indeed the Court’s decision came two years
after the tobacco companies and the state attorneys general reached settlement under the MSA. Rather,
FDA’s regulatory eﬀort marked the ﬁrst time a federal administrative agency posed a serious threat to the
tobacco industry and Congress failed to rescue it. Clearly the tobacco industry’s image was tarnished in the
eyes of its longtime supporters in Congress, in light of the 1994 Congressional testimony and the swath of
insider documents that were disclosed soon after. Even after control of Congress switched from Democrats
145Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 127.
146Id. at 120.
40to Republicans in 1995, the legislative branch refused to step in and disclaim FDA’s authority to regulate
tobacco, instead leaving the issue to be settled in court. The industry was undoubtedly aware that it could
have suﬀered defeat in a closely divided Supreme Court, and had a better bargaining position prior to the
decision than it would have had if the Court had come out the other way.
Kessler’s quest to regulate tobacco provided one further stimulus for the ultimate settlement agreement. In
a critical symbolic shift that identiﬁed smoking as more than a simple bad habit or an unhealthy activity,
Kessler successfully redeﬁned tobacco as a “pediatric disease.”147 In a speech at Columbia Law School,
Kessler ﬁrst used those terms to describe FDA’s approach to tobacco.148 The approach started a wave that
drew upon the agency’s credibility within Washington and with the public at large, and the overwhelming
scientiﬁc evidence that was mounting against the industry, that redeﬁned the political debate over how to
regulate tobacco industry practices.149 Such a symbolic shift represented a conscious attempt to recast the
smoking debate and focus on a segment of the population that was viewed as victimized by the industry,
minimizing the eﬀect of industry arguments that smokers had assumed any risks from smoking after adequate
warning.
D. State Legislatures Provide Support for Medicaid Lawsuits
One ﬁnal development that was critical to encouraging the tobacco industry to settle even in states where
147See Little, supra note 3, at 1145.
148See Kessler, supra note 137, at 319-20.
149See id. at 328.
41it had won preliminary court motions that undermined the Medicaid claims brought against them was that
some state legislatures stepped in to ease the legal rules to sustain the Medicaid lawsuits. “In one sense,
the cigarette companies were being held up with a toy gun. In [some courts], the legal theories on which
Mississippi had based its Medicaid claim were being rejected.... [However,] [t]hese suits didn’t die altogether,
because [the plaintiﬀs] asserted other claims as well...”150 Thus, even when courts were skeptical of the
Medicaid claims, they were unwilling to dismiss the lawsuits out-of-hand, preferring to consider other tort
theories set forth in the complaint. And state legislatures either stood ready to step in to ease the path of
the plaintiﬀs and back the tobacco industry into a proverbial corner, or at least refused to pass legislation
that would block the lawsuits from continuing under novel tort theories.
One telling example is the approach of the Florida legislature. In 1994, the state legislature amended the
state’s Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act to authorize a cause of action against tobacco companies for dam-
ages under Medicaid and to limit aﬃrmative defenses that were available to the tobacco industry in Medicaid
reimbursement lawsuits, a clear political rebuke of the industry with devastating legal consequences.151 In
fact, “[t]here can be absolutely no question that prior to the [1994 amendments] there was no independent
cause of action permitting the State to go forward in seeking Medicaid reimbursement.”152 The statute
further provided a market-share liability scheme for determining damages, thus enabling Florida to avoid
the problem created by having to prove its case against each individual tobacco company through individ-
ualized evidence rather than through statistical evidence on causation.153 And the Florida Supreme Court
upheld the statutory provision against a constitutional challenge,154 clearing the way for both Medicaid
150Michael Orey, Assuming the Risk: The Mavericks, the Lawyers, and the Whistle-Blowers Who Beat Big
Tobacco (1999).
151Fla. Stat. ch. 409.910 (2004).
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42reimbursement suits and suits based upon public nuisance claims for endangering the health of Florida’s
children.155
...Not all tort actions carry with them the same elements or aﬃrmative defenses. The
legislature must have the freedom to craft causes of action to meet society’s changing needs.
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged this necessity and has tempered the
legislative power of the States only with the rule against arbitrary and capricious actions.
The State’s action, as we have interpreted it, is neither arbitrary nor capricious. It is a
rational response to a public need....156
Here, the public need was identiﬁed through the lawsuits being ﬁled in the ﬁrst place; that is, the public need
is for the state to pay for some of the costs associated with citizens’ health eﬀects from smoking, and the
response was to seek compensation from the industry itself. Facing such opposition both in the legislature
and in the state court system, the tobacco industry unsurprisingly settled with Florida not long after these
judicial defeats.
Another example of aggressive action by state legislatures to assist the lawsuits was in Massachusetts, where
the legislature passed a law that would have required the tobacco companies to reveal critical information
about the ingredients of cigarettes that could have served to debunk industry claims and would have certainly
weakened its position in defending the Medicaid lawsuit.157 The moves in Massachusetts and Florida are
the strongest evidence of state legislatures’ willingness to buttress state executive oﬃcials’ lawsuits against
tobacco companies. Yet these aﬃrmative responses were not the only signiﬁcant development. The mere
refusal by almost every state’s legislature to intervene in the lawsuits on behalf of the tobacco industry,
or to pass legislation that would prohibit the claims from going forward, signaled a signiﬁcant shift in the
traditional politics of the issue. For a long time tobacco enjoyed what amounted to immunity in the court
155See id.; State v. American Tobacco Co., No. CL 95-1466 AH (Circuit Court of the 15th Judicial Circuit, Sept. 16, 1996),
available at http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/litigation/ﬂ/9-96orders.html
157Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 307B (held unconstitutional in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, 312 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 2002) (en
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43system from individual and class action lawsuits on behalf of injured smokers. Tobacco defendants had
enjoyed three sources of protection—liability protection from the warning system Congress ﬁrst required in
the 1965 FCLAA; assumption of risk defenses to tort claims; and the diﬃculties inherent in any class of
plaintiﬀs demonstrating causation by any individual tobacco defendant in a products liability suit. Now,
just as Congress showed no inclination to step in and block FDA’s attempt to regulate cigarette advertising
and promotion, most state legislatures permitted their respective executive branches to raise novel theories
that would return valuable dollars to the state treasuries. From this viewpoint, state legislatures actually
had an incentive to help facilitate the lawsuits; any damages won from the tobacco companies could be spent
by legislators on programs that suited their particular political goals. Moreover, as more documents revealed
manipulation on the part of the tobacco industry, fewer politicians at any political level would be inclined
to expend political capital to protect the industry, even if there did exist some skepticism as to the merits
of the legal claims.
IV. The Interplay of Politics and Law on Gun Control – The Uphill Battle for Gun Control
Litigation
If gun control advocates thought that the success of the state Medicaid lawsuits against tobacco companies
would give them a clear path for similar lawsuits against gun manufacturers seeking reimbursements for
state health care costs, they would ﬁnd themselves soon disappointed with the strong opposition such suits
generated in courts and legislatures around the country. A quick look at the economics of gun control and
tobacco would suggest that gun manufacturers would be far more likely to settle with plaintiﬀs who took
them to court. Whereas tobacco companies reaped in $48.7 billion in sales on tobacco products in 1995
and another $45 billion in 1998, during the peak of the state Medicaid lawsuits, the gun industry averaged
44only $1.4 billion per year during the same time period, making it far less able to defend numerous lawsuits
that might be ﬁled across the country.158 Moreover, the lawyers who ultimately initiated the products
liability, nuisance, and Medicaid lawsuits against the gun industry were part of a well-coordinated eﬀort.
The head of the Center to Prevent Handgun Violence’s litigation unit joined forces with the Castano Group,
a collection of lawyers responsible for initiating private lawsuits against the gun industry, to ﬁnancially
support municipalities’ lawsuits against the gun industry in return for 20% of all settlements and 30% of
all jury awards.159 Commentators predicted that the gun industry would enter into settlement agreements
and accept advertising and sales restrictions, then pass the cost oﬀ onto consumers through increases in gun
prices.160 Indeed, the gun suits rivaled the tobacco lawsuits in a crucial way—at the beginning of 2000, “the
public entity plaintiﬀs [were] highly coordinated and...thus able to bring intense settlement pressure to bear
on the defendants.”161
Yet for gun control advocates, the barrage of state and city lawsuits against gun manufacturers in the
post-Columbine era provided little relief from the dismay that had emerged from the general gridlock char-
acterizing gun control politics at the national level. For some legal reasons, and many political ones, the
pressure on gun manufacturers never climaxed at a point where a large-scale settlement became a reasonable
option. Comparing the outcomes to the factors that drove the tobacco companies to settle with the states
highlights four important diﬀerences of law and politics that explain these opposite outcomes. First, the
initial gun lawsuits failed to win early legal battles that would have sustained pressure on the gun industry
158Philip C. Patterson & Jennifer M. Philpott, Note, In Search of a Smoking Gun: A Comparison of Public Entity Tobacco
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45and provided it with some incentives to consider settlement. Unlike the early rulings in the Mississippi
tobacco lawsuit, the ﬁrst gun control lawsuits were quickly disposed. Second, the federal government took
a wholeheartedly opposite approach to the gun lawsuits than it did with respect to the state tobacco law-
suits. Whereas FDA had a credible argument that it had discretionary jurisdiction to regulate tobacco and
received little interference from Congress, no similar general grant of authority was available for the ATF
(an embattled and bruised political agency) to adopt the cause of gun control advocates. Congress even
attempted to block state and municipal lawsuits when it considered legislation oﬀering civil immunity to gun
manufacturers, and several state legislatures used their powers to protect the gun industry as well. These
decisions stemmed directly from the diﬀerences that distinguish the politics of gun control from the poli-
tics of tobacco. Third, there were no real “smoking guns” in the gun liability lawsuits, no documents that
overwhelmingly demonstrated deception and fraud on the part of the industry to help drive the lawsuits.
Finally, while the legal theories upon which the gun lawsuits were grounded varied across the jurisdictions,
none seemed particularly strong or sustainable under current interpretation of most tort law. Without some
common pressure across jurisdictions, the gun industry is unlikely to enter into a master settlement and
would likely prefer to take its chances in individual lawsuits.
A. The Initial Lawsuits Stall
One way to view the movement away from legislation and towards lawsuits is as a political calculation by
the anti-gun movement to shift from demand-side to supply-side attacks after what was perceived as the
NRA’s retribution against lawmakers in the 1994 elections for taking on guns in the Brady Bill and the
46Assault Weapons Ban.162 The approach marked an alliance among three diﬀerent actors—plaintiﬀs’ lawyers
seeking to capitalize upon the success of tobacco lawsuits, mayors and public oﬃcers under pressure for the
failed public policies of their jurisdictions in controlling crime, and anti-gun advocacy groups responding to
a history of legislative failures.163 Inspired by the early successes of the ﬁrst state tobacco lawsuits, some
municipalities and public entities exercised their own independence to challenge gun control manufacturers
on two basic theories of liability.
Most of the gun control lawsuits have been ﬁled by cities rather than by states or state attorneys general. One
common claim in those gun lawsuits is that ﬁrearms are “defective and unreasonably dangerous” products.164
The cities seek to recover the costs associated with treating gun victims in medical hospitals, paying police
overtime for dealing with gun crime, and for loss of tax revenue from diminished property values in gun-ridden
neighborhoods.165 The second claim often alleged is that the ﬁrearm industry has negligently marketed guns,
which has resulted in a public nuisance that threatens the safety of those in the community targeted by the
manufacturers.166 These legal theories are imbued with several legal problems and weaknesses which have
rendered them ineﬀective in providing relief to public entities that deal with the eﬀects of gun violence. But
the speciﬁc legal weaknesses of the cases are less important than the fact that judges in the earliest gun
control lawsuits recognized the relatively low probability of success and dismissed many of the suits out-of-
hand, empowering the gun industry to ﬁght all of the lawsuits rather than consider a widespread settlement
early on.
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47New Orleans initiated the city lawsuits against gun manufacturers on October 30, 1998, and was followed
shortly thereafter by Chicago. The mayors of Bridgeport, Connecticut and Miami-Dade County, Florida
also ﬁled lawsuits and started a parade of suits by many locations where gun violence had taken its toll on
city life.167 But by the end of 2000, after two years of lawsuits by cities and counties in various locations
around the country, gun control advocates had yet to see any preliminary victories that would alter the
status quo. Many failed to survive motions to dismiss; typical examples were the Bridgeport case, dismissed
because the city lacked statutory authority to pursue the case, and the Miami-Dade County case, which was
dismissed because “[p]ublic nuisance does not apply to the design, manufacture, and distribution of a lawful
product.”168 Lack of standing problems haunted cities ﬁling gun suits, whereas in tobacco lawsuits, “states
had standing to sue via either state statute or their sovereign right to protect their citizens’ welfare.”169
This raises the question as to why states did not ﬁle lawsuits against the gun industry and seek to coerce a
settlement or compromise as they successfully did in the tobacco context. The answer lies in the diﬀerences
between tobacco and gun control politics, highlighted earlier in this paper and discussed in the next section.
Had they tried to assert legal theories of this type, the state attorneys general would likely have come under
intense attack by the NRA and would have faced opposition from the governors and state legislatures in their
jurisdictions. The fear of being overruled might make attorneys general less inclined to pursue the lawsuits
167Other cities, counties, and states that ﬁled lawsuits included, in chronological order, Atlanta, GA (February 5, 1999);
Cleveland, OH (April 8, 1999); Detroit, MI (April 26, 1999); Wayne County, MI (April 26, 1999); Cincinnati, OH (April 28,
1999); St. Louis, MO (April 30, 1999); Alameda County, Berkeley, East Palo Alto, Oakland, Sacramento, San Francisco,
and San Mateo County, CA (May 25, 1999); Compton, Englewood, Los Angeles, and West Hollywood, CA (May 25, 1999);
Camden County, NJ (June 1, 1999); Boston, MA (June 3, 1999); Newark, NJ (June 9, 1999); Camden, NJ (June 21, 1999);
Los Angeles County, CA (August 27, 1999); Wilmington, DE (September 29, 1999); Washington, DC (January 20, 2000); New
York City (June 20, 2000); and New York State (June 26, 2000). See Patterson and Philpott, supra note 158, at 579 n.136;
http://www.csgv.org/issues/litigation/.
168Todd Lighty, Two Lawsuits Against Gunmakers Tossed Out, Chi. Trib., Dec. 14, 1999, at B1 (quoting the judge from the
Miami-Dade County lawsuit).
169Bryce A. Jensen, Note, From Tobacco to Health Care and Beyond—A Critique of Lawsuits Targeting Unpopular Industries,
86 Cornell L. Rev. 1334, 1376 (2001).
48without further political support.
B. The Politics of Gun Control Diminish the Likelihood of Successful Suits
For those who prefer stronger government regulation of behavior and support public reimbursement lawsuits,
gun control has proved a much more diﬃcult realm than tobacco politics. The response to an early court
victory for gun control advocates in Kelley v. R.G. Industries170 that seemed to open the door to possible
lawsuits like those ﬁled in the late 1990s is particularly instructive. In that case, a grocery store employee shot
by an unknown assailant sued the manufacturer of the gun used during the robbery, seeking damages under
strict liability theories that the gun was “abnormally dangerous” and that it was “unreasonably dangerous”
because it was defective in its “marketing, promotion, distribution and design.”171 While the court rejected
these two broad strict liability schemes, it authorized a more limited version of strict liability for Saturday
Night Specials, a group of ﬁrearms that “present particular problems for law enforcement oﬃcials” and
that are “...particularly attractive for criminal use and virtually useless for the legitimate purposes of law
enforcement, sport, and protection of persons, property, and businesses.”172 Speciﬁcally, a plaintiﬀ’s success
depended upon proof of three elements—(1) that plaintiﬀ’s harm was caused by the gunshot; (2) that the
plaintiﬀ was the victim of a crime; and (3) that the gun used was a “Saturday Night Special.”173 But the
court was careful to limit the scope of this scheme so as not to interfere with the general public policy
preferences of the state legislature.
170497 A.2d 1143 (Md. 1985).
171Id. at 1145.
172Id. at 1153-54.
173Id. at 1153-60. See also Danielle Feldman, Making Social Policy Through Courts: Gun Control Advocates Fight Firearms,
68 Def. Couns. J. 72, 74-75 (2001).
49In response to Kelley, the Maryland legislature passed a statute that reversed the decision and that was
designed to prevent the state courts from carving out similar public policy exceptions.174 The state legislature
reacted to what it perceived as “the court overstepp[ing] its judiciary role [by making] law in an area where
past attempts at gun control reforms in the state legislature had failed.”175 This approach is typical of
many states’ responses to city and county lawsuits against the gun industry. In Texas, one of the ﬁrst
states to ﬁle a Medicaid tobacco lawsuit, the legislature passed a law to prevent any gun lawsuits similar
to those in Kelley.176 The New Orleans lawsuit, the ﬁrst ﬁled by a public entity against the gun industry,
was eviscerated when the Supreme Court of Louisiana upheld a state statute that applied retroactively to
preclude the city from bringing its lawsuit against the ﬁrearms industry.177 At least twelve other states also
passed state laws designed to preempt lawsuits against the gun industry.178
1. The Constitutional Implications
One problem that the state legislatures were responding to is that broad liability for gun manufacturers on
the theory that all guns were “inherently hazardous” or “unreasonably dangerous” products would be steps
that could lead to the eﬀective shut-down of the industry, which would raise constitutional problems under
the Second Amendment.179 “[U]nlike tobacco, guns have a constitutionally protected status in America.”180
174Md. Code Ann., Art. 27 § 36-I (1985) (repealed 2003); Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc., 778 So. 2d 1042, 1044 n.1 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
175Feldman, supra note 173, at 76.
176Id. at 75.
177See Morial v. Smith & Wesson Corp., 785 So.2d 1 (La. 2001).
178States with such laws include Tennessee, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Louisiana, Maine, Montana, Nevada, Okla-
homa, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. See Patterson and Philpott, supra note 158, at 603 n.281, 604.
179See Jon S. Vernick & Stephen P. Teret, New Courtroom Strategies Regarding Firearms: Tort Litigation Against Firearm
Manufacturers and Constitutional Challenges to Gun Laws, 36 Hous. L. Rev. 1713, 1740 (1999); Dawson, supra note 9, at
1743.
180McCoskey, supra note 158, at 875.
50The NRA uses the rhetoric of attacks on constitutionally protected rights to help mobilize its base and to
pressure state legislatures to condemn lawsuits against gun manufacturers, drawing upon the gun culture to
motivate gun owners.181 Its ILA activity exerts intense pressure on individual lawmakers the lobbying group
perceives as strategically important; the perception of the group’s strength and its ability to marshal votes
to inﬂuence elections is often an inhibiting force for some lawmakers who otherwise see room to compromise
on gun control regulation within the language of the Second Amendment.182 In the words of the NRA
itself, “[v]ictory springs from imparting excruciating political pain in unrelenting political attacks on a single
politician as an example to others.”183
Given the iconic status of the Constitution, the NRA’s rhetoric and pressure are eﬀective at galvanizing
legislative eﬀorts against courtroom assaults on gun manufacturers that the lobbying group sees as an
attempted end-run around the political process. The group’s attacks have been further buttressed by the
recent Fifth Circuit decision in United States v. Emerson.184 In that decision, the Court broke from other
circuits’ conclusions about the Second Amendment and interpreted that constitutional provision as providing
an individual right to privately possess and bear ﬁrearms, rather than a collective right held by the state.185
While the Court recognized that there were limitations to this individual right of ownership,186 the holding
provides new support for gun rights advocates in their argument that the Second Amendment also protects
individual gun ownership from state interference. To date the Second Amendment has not been explicitly
incorporated to apply to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Yet a likely consequence of the
181See Spitzer, supra note 12, at 86.
182See id. at 99 (discussing the perception of NRA strength and the “hassle factor” that can often be an inhibiting force).
183Id. (quoting NRA internal document).
184270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 907 (2002).
185See id. at 260.
186See id. at 261, 223-24 (interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939) to stand
for the proposition that a particular type of ﬁrearm might fall outside the purview of the protection given to “Arms” in the
Second Amendment, and not that the Second Amendment applies only when arms are carried in the context of a military or
militia activity or purpose).
51legal theory Emerson adopted is that the Second Amendment would be incorporated, as the argument
against incorporation “would have to rest on the premise that the amendment guarantees only a collective
right.”187 Successful city and county lawsuits threaten to impose such harsh restrictions on an industry
that economically pales in comparison to tobacco that they might seriously impinge constitutional rights
as interpreted in Emerson. With the Second Amendment to draw upon, the NRA is better armed both
politically and legally than the tobacco lobby for such a ﬁght.
2. Animosity Towards Federal Legislative and Bureaucratic Eﬀorts on Gun Control
Not only do gun lawsuits face serious constitutional obstacles, they face a general disrepute in Washington.
And unlike FDA’s assault on tobacco, there is no federal agency that is capable of challenging the gun
industry and exposing any chinks in the armor that the industry has built up in Congress. The most blatant
rejection of the gun lawsuits was Congress’s attempt to outlaw them in the quiet aftermath of the failed
post-Columbine gun control legislation. In March 2004 the Senate blocked a bill that was proposed to grant
civil immunity to gun manufacturers, marketers, and distributors.188 While this result might be perceived
as a victory for gun control advocates, it is better seen as a victory for, rather than a rebuke of, the gun
industry.189 First, it often takes multiple appearances before a legislative body for a controversial bill to
generate enough support to win passage. In a Republican-led Congress with a Republican president who
publicly campaigned on tort reform, the bill is very likely to appear again. Second, and more importantly,
the gun lobby turned and defeated its own bill when a few Senators sought to impose some marginal measures
187McCoskey, supra note 158, at 896.
188S. 1806, 108th Cong. (2004).
189See Jean Macchiaroli Eggen & John G. Culhane, Public Nuisance Claims Against Gun Sellers: New Insights and Challenges,
38 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 1, 2 (2004).
52of gun control in the bill as a political compromise. When amendments to extend the 1994 assault weapons
ban and to remove the exemption from background checks for sales at gun shows were successfully added to
the bill,190 the gun lobby rejected the total package.191 The refusal to compromise is emblematic of the gun
industry’s approach to federal regulation.
While Congress remains inclined to avoid gun control regulation, no federal bureaucratic agency has been
willing or able to challenge gun manufacturers and Congress by attempting to regulate the industry in a
meaningful way. In 1972, Congress exempted guns from most consumer protection laws.192 Further, unlike
FDA, the ATF lacks an organic piece of legislation upon which its regulatory power is based; this makes the
agency reluctant to do anything controversial that would provoke the ire of Congress. For much of its history,
the ATF operated as an entity of the Treasury Department, created by department order and subject to
threats of abolition.193 Once agencies acquire statutory protection, they become much harder for Congress to
eliminate through the law. Once created, agencies garner support from diﬀerent political actors who impose
pressure on the federal government, including interest groups, professionals within the subject matter that
the agency has authority over, and the President, who would have to sign any legislation eliminating a federal
agency, that ultimately protects the agency’s existence. Without such protection, agencies are unlikely to
engage in decision-making that will generate much political opposition.
Moreover, ATF has not historically received strong ﬁnancial support in the allocation of federal law enforce-
190S. 1805, S.AMDT. 2625, 108th Cong. (2004) (regulating the sale and possession of armor-piercing ammunition); S. 1805,
S.AMDT. 2636, 108th Cong. (2004) (requiring background checks for ﬁrearms transactions at gun shows); S. 1805, S.AMDT.
2637, 108th Cong. (2004) (extending the Assault Weapons Ban for 10 years).
191Eggen and Culhane, supra note 189, at 2-3.
192Interview, Interview With Michael Barnes, President, Handgun Control, Inc., 6 Geo. Pub. Pol’y Rev. 31, 31 (2000); see
also supra note 86 and accompanying text.
193See Martinek, Meier & Keiser, supra note 36, at 18; William J. Vizzard, In the Cross Fire: A Political History of
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms 4-11 (1997).
53ment funding. In terms of ﬁscal (and hence political) strength, ATF has been smaller, and thus weaker,
than the Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, Immigration, Customs, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.194 Yet the agency is responsible for regulating individuals who apply for and obtain federal
ﬁrearms licenses, and while the number of licenses increased 59% from 1980 to 1993, ATF lost 13% of its
inspectors in the same period.195 During this period, 90% of applicants were never subjected to an interview
by an ATF inspector, even though violations were frequently uncovered when inspections occurred.196
One of the common claims of gun control opponents is that better enforcement of existing gun laws, rather
than more gun laws, is the more appropriate approach to reducing crime. Yet the lack of ﬁscal support for the
ATF indicates an unwillingness to equip federal agencies too much for enforcement of gun laws. Even though
the ATF gained independence from the Internal Revenue Service, it generally enjoys little political and public
support, and for a long time “[its] regulatory function generated very little interest and controversy, and its
law enforcement operations often were overshadowed by the FBI.”197 Its status remains uncertain today; in
2003 the agency’s law enforcement functions were transferred to the Department of Justice, and its strategic
plan has yet to be released to reﬂect the law enforcement mission.198 The move is likely to help strengthen
the ATF, but it is unlikely to yield additional federal regulation or legislation pertaining to ﬁrearms, as the
NRA has not shown signiﬁcant signs of weakening since 2003. Thus, there are few, if any, strong advocates
for expanded ATF jurisdiction and authority. Its natural constituency is civilian law enforcement, yet
194See Martinek, Meier & Keiser, supra note 36, at 24.
195Spitzer, supra note 12, at 139.
196Id.
197Vizzard, supra note 193, at 145.
198See ATF web site, http://www.atf.gov/about/mission.htm (last accessed March 29, 2005).
54[d]espite recent law enforcement support for the ATF, it appears to get less such support
than the other law enforcement agencies. Local police forces are far more likely to have
contact with the FBI and their labs and databases or the Drug Enforcement Agency....
Police are also more likely to identify with the elite federal agencies, the FBI and the Secret
Service, than the ATF. Thus, the ATF has sporadic support from law enforcement agencies
and must deal with continued and focused opposition from the NRA.199
Matched up against a lobbying group that is well organized and politically powerful, ATF ﬁnds itself in
an environment hostile to a bureaucracy interested in striking an innovative course of policy-making and
stretching the boundaries of its legislative direction and discretion.
The relative weakness of the ATF means that plaintiﬀs ﬁling gun lawsuits are indeed on their own, without
a federal agency or a strong Congressional constituency that will have their backs. Gun manufacturers
are aware of this, and they draw forcefully upon the NRA’s resources to organize political counterattacks
designed to combat the judicial attacks that they face from states, cities, counties, and private plaintiﬀs
seeking compensation for damages from gun violence. With the NRA essentially acting on behalf of the gun
industry, gun manufacturers have little incentive to enter into any large-scale settlements unless gun control
advocates can neutralize the NRA’s political inﬂuence and level the playing ﬁeld in state legislatures. The
road to victories in gun control legislation will likely have to include changing laws in many states to make
the tort realm more receptive to the theories of recovery advocated by gun lawsuit plaintiﬀs.
C. The Lack of Strong Symbols – No “Smoking Guns”
A further important factor that distinguishes tobacco lawsuits from gun control lawsuits is the absence of
55insider documents in the gun control context that demonstrate intentional manipulation and distortion by
the gun industry. Most ﬁrearms are intended to kill, and consumers are largely aware of this possibility
when purchasing guns. Other than ownership for pure deterrence, guns are owned because they can kill; no
studies are needed to prove their ability to injure, and while tobacco companies were oﬀering misinformation
to hide the dangers of their products, gun manufacturers do not claim that they are producing guns that will
not kill.200 Certainly guns are often misused (i.e. used in criminal activity), but simply because a product
can be used for a criminal purpose does not mean that it suﬀers from a defect.201 By contrast, cigarette
manufacturers can be relatively certain that when their cigarettes are purchased, the nicotine in them will
in fact be ingested.
Many gun manufacturers go even further, providing deliberate warning to consumers about the dangers of
ﬁrearms.
The comparison between guns and tobacco is a false analogy. Tobacco is an addictive drug
whose manufacturers lied about the harmful eﬀects of smoking. No secret is made about
the danger of ﬁrearms; indeed the arms industry is scrupulous about warning the consumer
what the misuse of its products will cause; many manufacturers will supply manuals, safety
information, and even trigger locks for their weapons long after they have gone out of
production, free of charge. The only similarity between the tobacco and gun lawsuits is that
they are aimed not at awarding damages for harm caused, but hurting the industry.202
The concept of addiction also led to conscious symbolic changes in the eﬀort to regulate big tobacco, recasting
smoking as a “disease” and a health crisis. Seeking to capitalize on that successful tactic, gun control
advocates also tried to recast guns as “pathogens” and gun ownership as a “disease.”203 The Centers for
200See Feldman, supra note 173, at 78.
201See Armijo v. Ex Cam Inc., 656 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D.N.M. 1987), aﬀ’d, 843 F.2d 406 (10th Cir. 1988).
203Little, supra note 3, at 1194.
56Disease Control went so far as to refer to guns as “a virus that must be eradicated.”204 If guns could be
treated as a public health issue, with violent death as the disease that results from them, then perhaps the
new public perception would serve to strengthen and deepen the political support for gun control. Such a
change in the public’s conscience might then lead to legislative policies that were more receptive to regulation
on, and litigation against, the gun industry. Yet, so far the linkage of guns with disease has not taken hold
in the same way it did in the tobacco context.
There is a possible set of data that would provide gun control advocates with the same legal support that
the insider documents provided in the tobacco lawsuits, through which the gun industry potentially could
show manipulation within the industry. Gun manufacturers face accusations that they knowingly manipulate
their marketing tactics at the expense of reasonable public safety.205 For example, “gun manufacturers were
well aware, through tracing procedures employed by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, that
a relatively small number of gun dealers, supplied by gun manufacturers, sold a large number of guns to
criminals who later used those guns in violent crimes.”206 One former Smith & Wesson employee provided
a sworn statement in a lawsuit that his company had targeted its distribution scheme to capitalize on loose
federal licensing regulations. “[Smith & Wesson] and the industry are...aware that the black market in
ﬁrearms is not simply the result of stolen guns but is due to the seepage of guns into the illicit market from
multiple thousands of unsupervised federal ﬁrearms licensees.”207
Further, since ATF traces ﬁrearms, there is some degree of communication between the agency and gun
manufacturers. Manufacturers therefore can learn which of their dealers have been involved in transactions
204Id.
205See Jensen, supra note 169, at 1371-72.
206Andrew M. Dansicker, The Next Big Thing for Litigators, 37 Md. Bar J. 12, 16 (July-Aug. 2004).
207Jo-Ann Moriarty, Lawsuit Aims at Gun Industry, in Guns in America, 480, 483 (1999) (quoting aﬃdavit of Robert Hass,
former vice president of Smith & Wesson).
57with guns that ultimately are used in crimes, and detect patterns that might emerge so as to curtail their own
marketing practices to minimize the likelihood that criminals end up with ﬁrearms.208 Successful lawsuits
would encourage this practice between ATF and gun manufacturers; yet it is unlikely that city and county
lawsuits will be successful without some evidence of deliberate manipulation by the gun industry because
of the relative weakness of most of the negligence theories that plaintiﬀs in the gun control lawsuits have
alleged, and the reluctance by most courts to adopt any version of a strict liability regime that would have
severe constitutional implications. What is left is the absence of any wholesale approach to the conduct of
gun manufacturers, and only regulations that govern the conduct of speciﬁc sales transactions. These types
of regulations have proved diﬃcult to draft, approve, and enforce.
It is not entirely clear why the gun industry has been able to fend oﬀ symbolic attacks designed to generate
more sympathy for gun control causes, but a couple of diﬀerences from the tobacco context seem important to
highlight. First, ironically, guns have some more practical use than tobacco, even if they are more dangerous
and violent. They are used by law enforcement to combat crime and by some citizens for protection or
deterrence. Indeed some policy-makers have argued that citizens are actually safer when more people carry
guns.209 Second, the primary eﬀects with which policy-makers are concerned with respect to smoking are
characterized as medical diseases—cancer, emphysema, and heart disease, for example. These diseases often
take a long time to develop and there are usually multiple factors that explain their prevalence. Thus,
individuals may be more naturally receptive to claims that smoking is a health problem because its eﬀects
are what we already consider to be health problems. By contrast, the impact of gun violence is generally
felt immediately, and is widely known and understood to be injuries and death; bullet wounds kill or maim
208See Eggen & Culhane, supra note 188, at 22-23.
209The most famous argument of this type was advanced in John R. Lott, Jr., More Guns, Less Crime: Understanding
Crime and Gun Control Laws (1998).
58but are not considered diseases, in the same way that broken bones from car accidents are direct medical
injuries but are not diseases. There are undoubtedly some additional factors that account for gun control
advocates’ failure to change the deﬁnitions that drive the debate over gun regulation, including the near
constant inﬂuence of the successful gun rights lobby, but the gun industry is unlikely to settle unless the
gun litigation produces evidence that gun manufacturers have deliberately misled the public or purposefully
sacriﬁced public safety by marketing to criminals.
D. Weakness in the Legal Theories of Gun Lawsuits
Even without the political factors that beneﬁt the gun industry in shaping the legal realm, the gun industry
would likely be unwilling to enter into any major settlement to stop the gun lawsuits that have been ﬁled
against it. The reason for this is that the current state of most products liability law provides cities and
counties with just a slim chance of winning court victories. Standing issues are only the opening hurdle for
public entity plaintiﬀs. Novel theories of liability have not been generally well received in courts because
they challenge fundamental understandings of traditional tort notions of negligence and strict liability.
Two basic legal theories have emerged in the public lawsuits—that ﬁrearms are defective products because
they inherently and unreasonably dangerous, and that the industry has created a public nuisance through
its negligent marketing approach.210 These theories have supported two diﬀerent types of contemporary
lawsuits, one alleging that gun manufacturers have been negligent in building safer guns by failing to take
210See Dawson, supra note 9, at 1743-45.
59precautions available under current technology,211 and the other alleging that negligent marketing and dis-
tribution includes deliberately oversupplying markets where gun control laws are weak to penetrate areas
where restrictions are tighter.212
As a starting point, courts have generally rejected claims by individual private plaintiﬀs that handguns are
intrinsically defective.213 Demonstrating that a product is unreasonably dangerous usually requires showing
four elements—that the product (1) was in a defective condition when it left possession of the seller; (2)
was therefore unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer; (3) was the proximate cause of the injuries;
and (4) had not substantially changed after leaving the possession of the manufacturer.214 For gun control
advocates, two clear problems emerge. First, a gun is not defective simply because it kills someone, but
rather might be defective if it fails to ﬁre when the trigger is pulled. Second, there is always a superseding
cause that intervenes between the time when the gun leaves the manufacturer’s hands and the time of the
injury, namely that in criminal activity someone other than the gun manufacturer pulls the trigger.215
In theory, the negligent marketing and distribution claims could have some traction in courts. If the gun
industry could be shown to have deliberately marketed weapons to individuals who were known to be using
them for criminal activity, then there is a reasonable argument that they are liable under contemporary
public nuisance law.216 In most of the early lawsuits ﬁled against the gun industry, courts rejected public
211An example of the allegations of negligence for failing to implement feasible safety technology is provided in the First
Amended Complaint in People v. Arcadia Machine & Tool, Inc. at paragraphs 119-134 (Superior Ct. of California, July 16,
1999) (No. BC 210894), available at http://www.csgv.org/issues/litigation/california/.
212An example of the public nuisance theory is Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 821 N.E.2d 1099 (Ill. 2004) (holding that
the city and county had failed to state a cause of action for public nuisance).
213See, e.g., Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, 743 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1984); Delahanty v. Hinkley, 564 A.2d 756 (D.C.
Ct. App. 1989); Hamilton v. Accu-tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
214Feldman, supra note 173, at 73-74.
215See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 440 (deﬁning a superseding cause as “an act of a third person or other force which
by its intervention prevents the actor from being liable for harm to another which his antecedent negligence is a substantial
factor in bringing about”).
216This is in contrast to the claim by Ruhl, Rizer & Wier that negligent marketing theories are absurd. Their claim is that
“[e]ven if there were a speciﬁc gun that criminals preferred, there is no way to deﬁnitely link this preference to the marketing
60nuisance claims because they stretched the traditional meaning of nuisance law. In one such instance, the
court was concerned that a new public nuisance theory could “devour in one gulp the entire law of tort.”217
Yet more recent decisions have opened up the possibility that a reinterpretation of public nuisance theory
could expose the gun industry to liability in suits by public entity plaintiﬀs. The court in City of Gary v.
Smith & Wesson Corp.218 took such an approach when it upheld a public nuisance claim by the city based
upon allegations that distribution and sales practices by gun manufacturers had provided illegal purchasers
with access to guns and enabled dealers to fail to comply with federal regulations. The court rejected the
notion that a public nuisance had to involve an unlawful activity or the use of land, saying instead that “a
nuisance claim may be predicated on a lawful activity conducted in such a manner that it imposes costs
on others.”219 Further, ATF documents on the sales history of guns used in crimes have formed the basis
of at least one private lawsuit against the gun industry on negligent marketing and negligent distribution
theories.220
Two additional developments in lawsuits ﬁled by non-government plaintiﬀs have opened the door to public
nuisance theories. First, the court in NAACP v. Acusport, Inc.221 held open the potential that gun
manufacturer defendants could reduce the harm resulting from diversion of guns into the illegal market by
implementing changes in their marketing and distribution practices without making intrusive changes, even
though it dismissed the NAACP lawsuit for failing to demonstrate suﬃcient harm to merit recovery.222
strategy of a manufacturer unless a blatantly inappropriate slogan such as ‘our gun is the best for robbing stores’ is used. A
similar argument applied to automobiles is that certain sports cars are associated with those who speed, so the manufacturers
of those cars should be held liable for the speeding.” Ruhl, Rizer & Wier, supra note 62, at 454-55. However, this ignores the
potential that documents or aﬃdavits from inside the gun manufacturing industry could reveal deliberate attempts to use data
on criminal activity to identify and market the weapons most heavily desired and used among those who commit violent crimes.
217Camden County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders v. Beretta, U.S.A. Corp., 273 F.3d 536, 540 (3rd Cir. 2001) (quoting Tioga
Pub. Sch. Dist. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 984 F.2d 915, 921 (8th Cir. 1993). See also People v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 761
N.Y.S.2d 192, (N.Y. App. Div. 2003).
218801 N.E.2d 1222 (Ind. 2003).
219Id. at 1232-34.
220See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 935 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (denying defendants’ motion for summary judgment). See
also Denise Dunleavy, Transcript from Beyond Tobacco Symposium, Comments on Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 27 Pepp. L. Rev.
743, 744-45 (2000).
221271 F. Supp. 2d 435 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
222For an in-depth discussion of the Acusport case, see Dansicker, supra note 206, at 17.
61Second, the Ninth Circuit found suﬃcient evidence that the ﬁrearms industry had facilitated a secondary
market for guns by targeting illegal purchasers and by failing to take suﬃcient precautions to diminish
the criminal market to reinstate a private lawsuit that included a public nuisance theory of liability.223
So far, however, these victories have not produced an extensive shift in the public entity lawsuits that
might otherwise encourage the gun industry to enter into a settlement and accept potential regulation.
It is possible that the aforementioned cases will continue and generate suﬃcient momentum to cause the
industry to reconsider its current position. However, the plaintiﬀs in City of Gary and in Ileto v. Glock face
substantial evidentiary challenges should the gun manufacturers decide to go to trial and take its chances
before a jury. And the gun industry still enjoys strong political support that could alter the background
rules in these cases to block the suits or diminish the likelihood of success for the plaintiﬀs.
V. Conclusion
For proponents of regulation, litigation presents itself as an alternative route to seek policy objectives where
public support generally favors regulation but the institutional and political dynamics make it unlikely that
the federal government will take strong actions against particular industries. Litigation oﬀers a chance
to achieve policy goals “that a captured legislative and regulatory system has failed to produce, despite
widespread public support.”224 And the threat of further litigation oﬀers the potential that an industry will
impose its own internal regulations as a way to avoid the costs of prolonged court battles.225 Yet even if those
seeking tighter regulation are successful in court or induce the industry to settle, the result may not yield the
223Ileto v. Glock Inc., 349 F.3d 1191 (9th Cir. 2003).
224Peter D. Jacobson & Kenneth E. Warner, Litigation and Public Health Policy Making: The Case of Tobacco Control, 24
J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 769, 793 (1999).
225See id. at 795.
62desired policy goals at all. For example, the MSA was successful at redistributing money from the tobacco
industry to the states and imposing some advertising restrictions on the industry. However, the states’
realization of the payments from the tobacco industry depends upon the tobacco companies continuing to
sell their product to earn the revenue necessary to meet the ﬁnancial obligations of the MSA.226 This gives
state legislatures little incentive to impose greater restrictions upon the tobacco industry that would seek to
reduce the number of smokers or the amount of tobacco sales in their respective states. And the MSA was
not able to incorporate broad policy changes of the type that could be approved by Congress and applied
to the entire country. In some respects, then, health care policy might end up no better oﬀ after litigation
than it was before the 1994 Mississippi lawsuit.
Moreover, it is appropriate to ask whether the MSA was in some respect a win for the tobacco industry
rather than for anti-smoking advocates. In agreeing to the MSA, the industry felt that committing portions of
future revenues towards payments to states protected it from potentially more damaging litigation that could
result in substantially higher awards, or from more restrictive regulation that might emerge from the changes
in tobacco politics in the 1990s. Indeed the industry might have settled precisely because the MSA oﬀered
some protection from evolving tort standards or state-created legal instruments that increased the likelihood
of the states winning judgments against the tobacco companies.227 While it included some advertising
restrictions, the MSA did not include penalties for the tobacco companies if reductions in teenage smoking
were not met, and the $206 billion settlement to end all existing state health care reimbursement claims was
smaller than damages considered in earlier settlement negotiations that were ultimately rejected in 1997.228
Moreover, it eliminated much of the risk associated with the unknowns of litigation—i.e. potentially high
226See Kessler, supra note 137, at 392-93.
227Eric A. Posner, Tobacco Regulation or Litigation?, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1141, 1144 (2003).
228Robert L. Rabin, The Tobacco Litigation: A Tentative Assessment, 51 DePaul L. Rev. 331, 340-41 (2001).
63damage awards—that make investors wary of purchasing stocks of publicly-owned tobacco companies. And
the decision in Brown & Williamson denying FDA jurisdiction over tobacco under the FDCA supplemented
the MSA to oﬀer tobacco companies additional protection from impingements upon their revenue streams.
It would be an overstatement to say that the MSA was a complete victory for the tobacco industry, however.
The agreement did not provide tobacco companies with protection from class action lawsuits or punitive
damage awards in other lawsuits ﬁled on behalf of individual smokers seeking compensation for the eﬀects
of smoking. The discovery of many damaging documents showing deliberate manipulation on the part
of industry insiders, and the ease with which those documents could be shared through technology with
lawyers and claimants across the country, left the tobacco industry vulnerable to some litigation. Indeed
these documents increased the likelihood that such individual and class action lawsuits would result in some
successes for claimants.229 Still, the industry insulated itself from the most damaging awards by settling with
the states, thus ensuring that the price of cigarettes would rise only modestly and enabling it to continue
to make a proﬁt even as it turned over some portion of those proﬁts to the states.230 In sum, then, much
as it always has done, tort law has served a regulatory purpose in the tobacco context to some degree.231
It just has been unable to yield the comprehensive regulatory approach that might be more likely to lead
to a signiﬁcant reduction in the amount of smoking, particularly among youths, that Kessler and other
policy-makers were working so hard to achieve by challenging the tobacco industry with FDA regulations.
In the gun context, proponents of regulation have not been able to induce many capitulations from gun
manufacturers or gun dealers to change their business practices. Moreover, cities and counties in their
229See id. at 345-46.
230See id. at 341.
231See Posner, supra note 227, at 1155.
64lawsuits have not been able to generate enough pressure to entice ﬁnancial payments from the gun industry,
and few are close to a trial that would test the mettle and the cohesiveness of the industry. Yet because
of the political stalemate that the NRA and gun-rights advocates have been able to sustain at the federal
level, litigation is likely to remain a preferred method of gun-control advocates, who will seek to build upon
the potential created by recent decisions in Ileto v. Glock and City of Gary. Litigation has the beneﬁt
of creating many pressure points, only some of which need be exposed to damage the gun industry. But
as in the tobacco context, it is hard to imagine that the gun lawsuits could generate new comprehensive
regulations that would eﬀectively combat the proliferation of guns on the market, or could signiﬁcantly aﬀect
business practices across the industry, such that there is major improvement on the problems created by the
ease with which guns cross state lines.
As a result of the political dynamics of social regulatory policy, which generates strong opposition from
well-organized and well-funded interested parties that often overwhelms a diﬀuse and less fervent majority,
litigation is likely to continue to make the courts a lively battleground in political issues. This trend raises
important questions about the proper role of the courts vis-` a-vis the legislative and executive branches of
government. As exempliﬁed by the contrast between the paths and results of the tobacco and gun lawsuits
to date, this trend makes the courts a focus of the intersection of law and politics. Politics largely explains
the diﬀerences between the tobacco and gun lawsuits, and will likely impact how courts respond to future
attempts to change or regulate an industry through the litigation process.
The trend also raises critical questions about whether public entity lawsuits yield the most appropriate
regulatory results, or whether the public interest is somehow sacriﬁced for the beneﬁt of the lawyers or
the individual concerns of the speciﬁc people heading the government agencies ﬁling suit. If a state seeks
65compensation from a dangerous industry, it might actually have an incentive to ensure that that industry
remains a lucrative one, or it might decide to allocate any compensatory awards towards policy preferences
unrelated to the dangers associated with the industry being sued. In the long run, public entity litigation does
not provide as desirable an approach to tackling diﬃcult policy problems as do legislative and non-judicial
regulatory ones.
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